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Were you reaching for your freedom
When the gatekeeper called for the toll? Styx1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW: TRUMP-ERA COMMUNICATIONS

AND ENERGY POLICIES IMPOSE TOLLS ON ENERGY 





Net neutrality−the principle that users should be able to access and 
distribute the Internet content of their choice without an Internet Service 
Provider’s (ISP) interference−is essential to electric grid reliability,
safety, cost-effectiveness, and the reduction of electric sector Greenhouse 
Gases (GHGs) and black carbon emissions that drive climate change.2 
Since 1996, the electric power system has been designated by law as “critical 
[i]nfrastructure” whose cyber and physical security are vital to the U.S.
economy and national interest.3 Yet, in December 2017, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) voted on party lines to repeal net 
1. Styx, What Have They Done to You, Brave New World (Pumpkin Studios, 1999),
https://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/styx/whathavetheydonetoyou.html.
 2. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 141, 145-46 (2003) (defining net neutrality as the principle that the networks 
that carry Internet traffic should be neutral as among Internet applications); CALIFORNIA
AIR RESOURCES BOARD (CARB), 2017 EDITION CALIFORNIA GHG EMISSION INVENTORY
(June 6, 2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/2000_2015/ghg_inventory
_trends_00-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZUC-4WA2] (“Emissions from the electric power 
sector comprise 19% of 2015 [California] statewide GHG emissions.”); T.C. Bond, S.J. 
Doherty, et. al., Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A scientific assessment, 
118 J. OF GEOPHYSICAL RES. 5380, 5388 (June 2013), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ 
jgrd.50171/pdf [http://perma.cc/ZA5A-3ZLK] (finding that black carbon such as that produced 
by diesel exhaust ranks second only to carbon dioxide for its climate-warming effects). 
3. Presidential Exec. Order No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347, 1996 WL 33673768 
(July 15, 1996); see Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (CIPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 5195c (Supp. I 2001), Pub.L. 107-56, Title X, § 1016, Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 400. 
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neutrality rules without considering their importance to critical infrastructure
sectors, including energy.
This Article argues that enforceable net neutrality rules are necessary to 
protect critical infrastructure such as the energy, water, and communications
sectors which are foundational to America’s economy and democracy.  This
analysis contends that the FCC’s failure to address the impact of net neutrality’s
repeal on critical infrastructure, the corruption of the FCC’s comment
process by those who allegedly used stolen identities to file comments, and 
the FCC’s baffling tolerance of those allegedly false filings, merit vacatur 
of the FCC’s Order as arbitrary and capricious decision-making in violation
of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).4 
The Internet is an engine of innovation that has heretofore allowed content 
transmission without ISP permission or charges, apart from customer
subscription fees.5  The FCC’s 2018 “Internet Freedom” Order for the 
first time gives ISPs legal permission to erect toll booths between subscribers 
and content providers. The FCC authorized ISPs to charge content providers
to transmit or speed ahead internet data, even if doing so degrades other 
users. The FCC Order imposes no limits on who−foreign or domestic−could 
buy paid priority.  Nor are ISPs required to offer priority access to all, to 
charge buyers the same price for priority, or to safeguard other users from 
paid priority delays.6  Effective June 11, 2018, the FCC’s Internet Freedom
Order allows ISPs to manage internet traffic in their own business interest,
repealing the FCC’s March 2015 “Open Internet” Order’s bright-line rules.7 
4. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551, et. seq.; 5 U.S.C.A § 706 (West) (Scope of Judicial Review);
see Catherine Sandoval, Reply Comments, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 
WC Docket No. 17-108, Aug. 30, 2017, at 2–3 [hereinafter Sandoval, Internet Freedom 
Reply Comments].
5. FCC, In the Matter of Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd.
5601, 5604 (2015), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-15-24A1.docx [https://perma.cc/
2QC9-YMFN] [hereinafter FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order] (“the Verizon court upheld 
the Commission’s finding that Internet openness drives a “virtuous cycle” in which
innovations at the edges of the network enhance consumer demand, leading to expanded
investments in broadband infrastructure that, in turn, spark new innovations at the edge”) 
(citing Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); Kevin Werbach, A Layered 
Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 58 (2002) (“A new service 
can be deployed simply by connecting two client devices capable of talking to one another,
without requiring any approval or technical configuration inside the [Internet] network.”). 
6. See Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 27. 
7. FCC, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, at ¶¶ 2–
4, 220 (WC Docket No. 17-108) (2018) (adopted Nov. 22, 2017, released Jan. 4, 2018) 
(repealing FCC rules adopted in 2015 that prohibited ISPs from blocking, throttling, or
paid prioritization of Internet traffic except for limited reasonable network management justifications) 
[hereinafter FCC, Internet Freedom Order]; cf. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at
¶¶ 215–216. David Shepardson, U.S. “net neutrality” rules will expire on June 11: FCC, 
REUTERS, May 10, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-internet/u-s-net-neutrality­
rules-will- expire-on-june-11-fcc-idUSKBN1IB1UN [https://perma.cc/4HZQ-3DM9].
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The FCC’s Internet Freedom Decision failed to take into account the 
billions invested in the U.S. electric grid to integrate communications and 
information technology including the internet. Energy reliability has been
a federal priority since Congress adopted the Electricity Modernization 
Act (EMA) in 2005 which charged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) with adopting reliability standards.8  The Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) unleashed billions in “smart grid” investments 
spanning from the Smart Meter to the smart home to the smart phone to
connect energy data, programs, and resources through the internet.9 
Likewise, FERC omitted any consideration of the internet’s role in achieving 
electric grid reliability in its 2017 proposal to pay more to energy resources
with 90 days of fuel on hand, effectively−coal-and-nuclear-powered
generators−to achieve nebulous reliability benefits.10 In January 2018,
FERC rejected the NOPR, finding that it failed to show, as required under
Section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), that existing tariffs are unjust, 
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, and that the proposal 
meets that standard.11 Along with its rejection of the NOPR, FERC initiated
a new proceeding, directing Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) which run wholesale energy markets 
under FERC jurisdiction, to submit reports examining how grid resiliency
should be defined and assessed, and what additional steps are merited to 
promote resiliency.12 Neither the 2017 FERC grid reliability proposal, nor
FERC’s January 2018 directive for ISO and RTO reports on grid resiliency,
considered the role of Internet-enabled energy resources and the open 
Internet in energy grid resiliency, reliability, and cybersecurity. 
Drawing on my experience as a Commissioner of the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC) from January 2011 to January 2017, this 
Article explores the interdependence of the electricity sector and the open 
8. Electricity Modernization Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.A. § 15801, Pub. L. No. 109­
58, § 1211, 119 Stat. 594, 941–46 (2005). 
9. Public Law No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) (The Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007 (EISA)); FERC, Smart Grid Policy, 127 FERC ¶ 61,139, 61,592 (May
19, 2009) (citing EISA, 121 Stat. 1492, Section 1301). 
10. FERC, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, NOPR, 82 Fed. Reg. 194, 46,940 (Oct. 
10, 2017) (Docket No. RM18–1–000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter FERC,
Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, NOPR].
11. FERC, Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding,
and Establishing New Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,020, (Docket No. RM18-1-000) Jan. 8, 
2018 [hereinafter FERC, NOPR Termination and Grid Resiliency Rulemaking].
12. Id. at ¶ 18.
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and neutral internet. Section II of this Article discusses the evolution of 
critical infrastructure laws and policies. Section III examines California’s 
energy loading order adopted in 2003 to increase energy reliability and protect
the environment. Section IV analyzes the evolution of federal and state
Smart Grid policies to infuse communications and information technologies 
including the internet into the energy ecosystem. Section V discusses FERC’s
authorization of demand response−the reduction of energy consumption
on call−as a resource eligible to bid in FERC wholesale energy markets.
Section VI examines the internet’s role in electric grid reliability, public 
safety, and environmental protection as exemplified by California’s response
to: the outage of the San Onofre Nuclear Power plant beginning in 2012, 
natural gas shortages in California during the Polar Vortex of 2014, and 
the methane leak at the Aliso Canyon Natural Gas Storage field in Los Angeles
beginning in November 2015 that diminished fuel resources for gas-fired 
electric power plants.
Section VII analyzes the FCC’s 2018 Internet Freedom Order. It argues 
that the FCC’s failure to consider critical infrastructure including energy
in its net neutrality repeal order constitutes arbitrary and capricious decision-
making under the APA.  This section examines the potential harms of ISP 
paid priority deals for electric reliability, safety, rates, and the environment. 
It analyzes the limits of antitrust, unfair competition, consumer protection
laws, and disclosure rules which provide no redress for harms to energy
safety, reliability, costs, and the environment, in contrast to the FCC’s 2015 
Open Internet Order.13 
Section VIII recommends that the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order be vacated 
in light of its serious deficiencies under the APA.14  Identity thieves allegedly
submitted millions of comments in the Internet Freedom Docket in other 
people’s names without their authorization; the FCC’s shockingly poor
comment process flunks the APA.15 This Article argues that publicly traded
13. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (holding that 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and protect against “antitrust injury” “attributable to an
anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.”).
14. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2002), 
opinion modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Allied-Signal, Inc. v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“The decision 
whether to vacate depends on the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the 
extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences of an 
interim change that may itself be changed.”).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Office of Attorney General Schneiderman, State of New 
York, A.G. Schneiderman Releases Open Letter To FCC: Net Neutrality Public Comment
Process Corrupted By “Massive Scheme,” Nov. 21, 2017, https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ 
ag-schneiderman-releases-open-letter-fcc-net-neutrality-public-comment-process [https:// 
perma.cc/PWW6-RZVJ]; Brian Naylor, As FCC Prepares Net Neutrality Vote, Study Finds 
Millions of Fake Comments, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Dec. 14, 2017, https://www.npr.org/ 
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companies should report the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order as a material
and cybersecurity risk under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Rules. It argues that states and state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) 
and Public Service Commissions (PSCs) (collectively PUCs) should protect
their residents through the exercise of the police power inherent in the 
states and PUC’s jurisdiction.16 This Article concludes in Section IX by urging 
the maintenance of legally enforceable net neutrality rules to protect critical
infrastructure, energy reliability, the economy, national security, public safety, 
democracy, and the open Internet.
II. DEFEND BEYOND THE FORTRESS: PROTECT CRITICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE VITAL TO AMERICA’S
 
ECONOMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
 
The Energy Sector, along with several other key segments of the American
economy, has been designated as “critical infrastructure” since President 
Clinton’s 1996 Executive Order recognized the need to protect the nation
from physical and cyber threats to these sectors. Executive Order No. 
13010 recognized that “[c]ertain national infrastructures are so vital that their
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense 
or economic security of the United States.”17 President Clinton’s Executive
Order designated as critical sectors “telecommunications, electrical power
systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, 
transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, 
police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government.”18 
President Clinton’s 1996 Executive Order recognized two categories of 
threats to critical infrastructure: “physical threats to tangible property (‘physical
threats’), and threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based 
attacks on the information or communications components that control 
critical infrastructures (‘cyber threats’).”19 Each of these categories remains
2017/12/14/570262688/as-FCC-Prepares-Net-Neutrality-Vote-Study-Finds-Millions-of­
Fake-Comments [https://perma.cc/KFG2-VZ3T].
16. McKay Jewelers v. Bowron, 19 Cal.2d 595, 122 P.2d 543 (1942) (noting the “police 
power” is an attribute of state sovereignty founded on the duty of the state to protect its 
citizens and provide for the safety and general welfare); see, e.g. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§
451, 701. 
17.   Presidential Exec. Order No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347, 1996 WL 33673768

































     
an important concern more than two decades later as physical and cyber 
threats have continue to evolve.
The September 11, 2001 attacks on America led to the passage of the 
Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (CIPA) as part of the U.S.A.
Patriot Act.20 CIPA defines critical infrastructure as those “systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.”21 CIPA “defines critical 
infrastructure not with reference to the identity of the target, but by the 
consequences of an attack on it.”22 
Congress recognized in CIPA “[t]he information revolution has transformed
the conduct of business and the operations of government as well as the 
infrastructure relied upon for the defense and national security of the 
United States”23 CIPA established as United States policy:
1.	 that any physical or virtual disruption of the operation of the 
critical infrastructures of the United States be rare, brief, 
geographically limited in effect, manageable, and minimally
detrimental to the economy, human and government services, 
and national security of the United States; 
2.	 that actions necessary to achieve the policy stated in 
paragraph (1) be carried out in a public-private partnership
involving corporate and non-governmental organizations; and
3.	 to have in place a comprehensive and effective program to
ensure the continuity of essential Federal Government functions 
under all circumstances.24 
Congress adopted these policies in light of its findings incorporated into 
CIPA that “[a] continuous national effort is required to ensure the reliable 
provision of cyber and physical infrastructure services critical to maintaining 
the national defense, continuity of government, economic prosperity, and 
quality of life in the United States.”25 President Obama’s 2013 Presidential 
Executive Order directed federal agencies to support critical infrastructure 
cyber and physical security, consistent with CIPA’s mandates.26 
20.  42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). 
21. Id.
 22. Nicholas Bagley, Benchmarking, Critical Infrastructure Security, and the Regulatory
War on Terror, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 47, 51 (2006). 
23.  42 U.S.C. 5195c (b)(1).
24. Id.
 25. Id.
26. The White House, Presidential Policy Directive–Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience (PPD-21), Feb. 12, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press­
8
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The 2003 Great Eastern Blackout,27 the California Electricity Crisis of
2000 to 2001,28 and increasing concern about the need to ensure electric
reliability for economic security and public safety spurred passage of the 
2005 Energy Policy Act (EPA). In August 2003 a tree hit a line in Ohio 
leading to a cascading failure which left 50 million people without power
for up to two days.29 That blackout was one of America’s most widespread
outages until Puerto Rico and parts of the U.S. Virgin Islands were plunged 
into darkness as the electric grid collapsed during hurricane Maria in September
2017.30 
President George W. Bush signed the EPA in 2005 to promote “dependable, 
affordable, and environmentally sound production and distribution of 
energy for America’s future.”31  The “Electricity Modernization Act of 
2005,” Title XII of the EPA, requires electric power grid operators to ensure
grid reliability.32 FERC Orders 888 and 889, adopted in 1996, authorized the
office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil
[https://perma.cc/RB88-HZXZ]; Dept. of Homeland Security, Critical Infrastructure Sectors,
https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors, last visited Oct. 28, 2017, https://www.
dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors [https://perma.cc/S65Y-3STL] [hereinafter PPD-21];
Exec. Order No. 13800, 82 Fed. Reg. 22391 § 2(d) (2017), Presidential Executive Order 
on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, May 
11, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order­
strengthening-cybersecurity-federal-networks-critical-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/
8DWW-M7WS] [hereinafter President Trump Executive Order on Cybersecurity].
27.  Kristoffer James S. Jacob, Energy Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century, 44
ECOLOGY L.Q. 375, 418 (2017). 
28. See Pub. Util. Comm’n of  Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 462 F.3d 1027, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(providing a history of the events leading up to, during, and the regulatory proceedings 
and litigation following the California Electricity Crisis of 2000-2001 through 2006). 
29.  JR Minkel, The 2003 Northeast Blackout–Five Years Later, Tougher regulatory
measures are in place, but we’re still a long way from a “smart” power grid, SCI. AM.,
Aug. 13, 2008, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/2003-blackout-five-years-later/ 
[https://perma.cc/78F4-BDVS] (The 2003 blackout contributed to at least 11 deaths and cost
an estimated $6 billion).
30.  Umair Irfan, Hurricane Maria has now caused the longest blackout in US history,
Only 30 percent of Puerto Ricans have power, extending the island’s lead in this outage, 
VOX, Oct. 30, 2017, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/30/16560212/
puerto-rico-longest-blackout-in-us-history-hurricane-maria-grid-electricity.
31. George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Aug. 8,
2005, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64861 [https://perma.cc/QP9A-UB75]. 
32. Energy Policy Act of 2005, PL 109–58, Aug. 8, 2005, 119 Stat 594, 16 U.S.C.
824o, § 215(b) (“The Commission shall have jurisdiction, within the United States, over
the ERO [Energy Reliability Organization] certified by the Commission under subsection
(c), any regional entities, and all users, owners and operators of the bulk-power system, including
but not limited to the entities described in section 201(f), for purposes of approving reliability
 9





   








   
 
 









    
   
     
  
   
      
formation of Independent System Operators (ISOs) or Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) to manage wholesale power trading and the electric
grid.33  Approximately “two-thirds of the nation’s bulk energy grid and
wholesale markets are managed by seven RTOs and ISOs”34 which work 
to ensure reliability.  The bulk power system “refers to the network of
interconnected generation and transmission lines, while the distribution system 
refers to the lower-voltage generally radial lines that deliver electricity to the
final customer.”35 EMA conferred FERC with the duty and jurisdiction 
to approve and enforce electric reliability standards developed by an Electric
Reliability Organization (ERO). In July 2006, FERC certified the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) as the ERO to establish 
bulk transmission system standards for planning, preparation, contingency,
and operations.36 
Electric reliability standards and practices often focus on preventing and 
responding to the “Severe Event, namely “one so damaging that afterwards 
the electricity services remained degraded for months or years.”37  In
standards established under this section and enforcing compliance with this section. All
users, owners and operators of the bulk-power system shall comply with reliability standards 
that take effect under this section.); Joe D. Whitley, George A. Koenig, Steven E. Roberts,
Homeland Security, Law, and Policy Through the Lens of Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Asset Protection, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 259, 276–77 (2007) (citing Electricity Modernization 
Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.A. § 15801 (2005)). 
33. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities 
and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,540 (1996), clarified, 76 FERC ¶¶ 61,009, 61,347 (1996) (“Order 888”), on reh’g, 
Order No. 888–A, F.E.R.C. Stats. &  Regs. ¶ 31,048, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274, clarified, 79
FERC ¶ 61,182 (1997), on reh’g, Order No. 888–B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248, 62 Fed.Reg. 
64,688 (1997), on reh’g, Order No. 888–C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998); Open Access Same– 
Time Information System and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, F.E.R.C. Stats. & 
Regs. ¶ 31,035, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (1996) (“Order 889”), on reh’g, Order No. 889–A, 
F.E.R.C. Stats. &  Regs. ¶ 31,049, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,484 (1997), on reh’g, Order No. 889– 
B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,253 (1997).  See Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 
F.3d 667, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002)
(“Under these orders, utilities must now provide access to their transmission lines to
anyone purchasing or selling electricity in the interstate market on the same terms and 
conditions as they use their own lines. By requiring utilities to transmit competitors’ 
electricity, open access transmission is expected to increase competition from alternative 
power suppliers, giving consumers the benefit of a competitive market.”).
34. Amy L. Stein, Regulating Reliability, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1191, 1218–19 (2017). 
35. Id. (citing Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Renewable Electricity Futures Study,
Bulk Electric Power Systems: Operations and Transmission Planning 22-1 (2012), http://www.
nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/52409-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FA6-7RQA]). 
36. Id.
37. Roland L. Trope & Stephen J. Humes, Before Rolling Blackouts Begin: Briefing
Boards on Cyber Attacks That Target and Degrade the Grid, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 647,
652–53 (2014). 
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addition to widespread severe events such as the electric outage in Puerto 
Rico and the Virgin Islands, and the 2003 Northeastern Blackout, electric 
reliability issues often manifest through localized outages or risks. If not
managed properly and quickly, localized outages can grow and cause problems
including cascading outages as energy load leans on neighboring resources. 
As U.S. economic sectors became more reliant on and intertwined with 
the Internet, President Obama updated critical infrastructure designations 
in 2013 through Presidential Policy Directive–Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience (PPD-21).38  That Executive Order designated sixteen sectors
as “Critical Infrastructure: Chemical; Commercial Facilities; Communications;
Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defense-Industrial Base; Emergency Services;
Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities;
Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors, 
Materials and Water; Transportation Systems; Water and Wastewater Systems.39 
PPD-21 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop situational
awareness capability for critical infrastructure, requiring action to address 
evolving threats and consequences. PPD-21 remains in force, and President
Trump has not changed critical infrastructure sector designations as of June
2018.
PPD-21 identifies “energy and communications systems as uniquely critical
due to the enabling functions they provide across all critical infrastructure
sectors.”40  Energy and communications systems are key drivers for the U.S. 
economy, democracy, and national security, underlying the operations of nearly
all businesses, public safety organizations, healthcare providers, education, 
and government.41 
Energy and communications play a symbiotic role with each other; 
energy is necessary for almost all modern communications systems, and
communications systems are increasingly integral to energy facilities and
services. “Critical infrastructures and key assets are highly dependent on 
38. PPD-21, supra note 26. 
39. Id.
 40. Id.
 41. See Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Opinion: Net neutrality safeguards democracy, 
the economy and national security, MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 12, 2017 (arguing that following 
adoption of the FCC’s net neutrality repeal order “Health care providers who use the 
internet to access electronic medical records, educational institutions, water and energy
companies, government institutions, businesses and individuals who post content become


























    
     
  
   
     
 
    
 
 
each other. The failure of one critical infrastructure or key asset may quickly
cascade and damage the functionality of nearby sectors.”42 The failures of 
water treatment and delivery following the loss of power in Puerto Rico,
illustrates the interconnection between electricity and other critical infrastructure
services.43 
Recognizing the pivotal role of communications to critical infrastructure, 
PPD-21 charges the FCC, to the extent permitted by law, to exercise
its authority and expertise to partner with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Department of State, and other Federal departments 
and agencies as appropriate, on: 
(1) identifying and prioritizing communications infrastructure; (2) identifying
communications sector vulnerabilities and working with industry and other stakeholders
to address those vulnerabilities; and (3) working with stakeholders, including
industry, and engaging foreign governments and international organizations to increase 
the security and resilience of critical infrastructure within the communications
sector and facilitating the development and implementation of best practices promoting 
the security and resilience of critical communications infrastructure on which the
Nation depends.
PPD-21 requires the FCC to do more than attend agency and stakeholder 
critical infrastructure meetings.  This Executive Order requires the FCC
to identify communications sector vulnerabilities including those raised
by the FCC’s own rulemakings, and to address and mitigate those concerns.
42.  Whitley, et al., supra note 32, at 269–70. 
43.  Sean Breslin, Puerto Rico, One Month After Hurricane Maria: 3 Million Without 
Power, 1 Million Without Water, WEATHER CHANNEL, Oct. 20 2017, https://weather.com/
storms/hurricane/news/2017-10-20-puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-by-the-numbers [https://perma. 
cc/WLF3-67K8] (one month after Hurricane Maria approximately 3 Million people in
Puerto Rico lacked power, 88 percent of the population; 1 Million lacked drinking water;
all who had service restored are under a boil-water advisory, 29 percent of the population; 
754 of 1,619 cell towers were working); Patrick Gillespie, Misery in Puerto Rico: No
power, no job, ‘enormous’ lines, CNNMONEY, Oct. 18, 2017, http://money.cnn.com/2017/
10/16/news/ economy/puerto-rico-unemployment/index.html [https://perma.cc/F3HD-XDRN]
(many Puerto Ricans have “no job along with no electricity or running water” after Hurricane
Maria as the Island faces a long restoration process for energy, communications, and water
service).
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III. THE LOADING ORDER, RISK MITIGATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Following the California Energy Crisis period of 2000 to 2001, when
Enron and others engaged in market manipulation that dramatically 
increased energy prices and led to periodic blackouts,44 California sought
to transform its energy markets and secure its future.  California adopted 
laws to reduce energy demand, diversify energy supply, and increase use
and integration of renewable energy. The open Internet has been critical 
to achieving California’s energy and environmental goals. 
In 2003, the CPUC and the California Energy Commission which is 
charged with long-term energy planning and energy siting issues, adopted
the Energy Action Plan to establish goals for the state’s energy strategy.45 
The plan placed cost-effective energy efficiency and demand response at 
the top of the loading order to be dispatched first to meet energy needs,
followed by renewable energy and distributed generation, then by fossil-
fueled resources.46  In 2004, the CPUC adopted procurement policies to
implement the loading order and diversify California’s energy market in 
a manner that reduces its environmental impact.47 
In 2005, Assembly Bill (AB) 380 required the CPUC to establish resource
adequacy requirements to ensure that adequate physical generating capacity
would be available to meet peak demand. Energy resource planning includes
procurement and steps to ensure that those resources can respond when
called. The Internet facilitates calling energy resources to balance energy 
44. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 462 F.3d at 1040 (“Under the ‘Death Star’ 
strategy, Enron allegedly sought to be paid for moving energy to relieve congestion
without actually moving any energy or relieving any congestion. All of the demand was
created artificially and fraudulently, creating the appearance of congestion, and then satisfied
artificially, without the company providing any energy . . . On June 14, 2000, energy
consumers in Northern California experienced their first wave of rolling blackouts. The 
California Parties allege that this occurred because of market manipulation. They claim 
that the data indicates that the large California generators utilized economic or physical 
withholding strategies 94% of the time during the May through November 2000 period.”). 
45. State of California Energy Action Plan, CONSUMER POWER AND CONSERVATION 
FINANCING AUTH., ENERGY RES. CONSERVATION AND DEV. COMM’N, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N,
CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (May 8, 2003), http://www.energy.ca.gov/energy_action_plan/ 
2003-05-08_ACTION_PLAN.PDF [https://perma.cc/28HD-26XN].
46. Id. at 4. 
 47. CPUC D.04-09-060, Order Instituting Rulemaking to Examine the Commission’s
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supply and demand. The ability to reduce energy load on call lessens the 
need to engage supply side resources such as fossil-fueled power plants. 
By reducing demand during peak hours when energy demand is at its highest, 
Demand Response “can offset the need to run power plants that would be 
extremely costly to run at those peak hours,” lowering wholesale electricity 
prices during peak times.48  Energy efficiency structurally embeds demand
reduction, saving energy costs while diminishing GHG production. 
In 2006 California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed AB 32
which requires California to reduce its GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020–a reduction of approximately 15 percent below emissions expected
under a “business as usual” scenario.49 That same year he also signed Senate
Bill 1368 which established a GHG emissions performance standard for
baseload generation owned by, or under long-term contract to publicly
owned utilities, of 1,100 lbs CO2 per megawatt-hour (MWh).50 
Beginning in 1991, Public Utilities Code 701, required the CPUC to 
protect the environment by ensuring that IOUs increase total procurement
of eligible renewable energy resources by at least an additional one percent 
of retail sales per year.51 In 2002 California Governor Gray Davis signed
Senate Bill (SB) 1078, establishing a 20% renewable portfolio standard 
(RPS) for electric corporations to be achieved by 2017.52  Governor
Schwarzenegger accelerated RPS standards in 2006 through California Senate 
Bill 107 which requires that twenty percent of electricity retail sales be
served by renewable energy resources by 2010.53 Governor Brown increased
48. Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?: FERC’s Authority over Demand 
Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 69, 78 (2013) [hereinafter, Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?].
49. The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, A.B. 32, ch. 488, Statutes of
2006; California Air Resource Board, Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CAL. AIR RESOURCE BD.,
Aug. 4, 2014, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm [https://perma.cc/ 3N5Z-C5W3].
50. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8340-41 (West 2009); Andrew F. Adams, It’s Getting
Hot in Herre: California Senate Bill 1368 and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1 SAN DIEGO 
J. CLIM. & ENERGY L. 287, 314 (2009) (citing CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(b)(1)-(d)(2)
requiring the CPUC to set the GHG performance standard at “no higher than the rate of
emissions of greenhouse gases for combined-cycle natural gas baseload generation.”). 
51. Kevin S. Golden, Senate Bill 1078: The Renewable Portfolio Standard-
California Asserts Its Renewable Energy Leadership, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 693, 713 (2003)
(citing Pub. Util. Code § 701.3, “Until the commission completes an electric generation
procurement methodology that values the environmental and diversity costs and benefits
associated with various generation technologies, the commission shall direct that a specific 
portion of future electrical generating capacity needed for California be reserved or set
aside for renewable resources.”).
52. S.B. 1078 § 3, 2001 Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (amending Pub. Util. Code §
399.12(b) (Deering 2003)).
53. S.B. 107, ch. 464, Statutes of 2006, http://www.energy.ca.gov/portfolio/documents/ 
documents/sb_107_bill_20060926_chaptered.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZM6-PZCX].
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the RPS target in 2011 through Senate Bill X1-2, requiring 33% renewable 
energy generation resources by 2020.54 
In 2015, California adopted SB 350 which increased the energy RPS 
requirements to 50% by 2030 to reduce energy sector GHG emissions, a
goal raised to 100% renewable energy by 2045 within the 2018 signature 
of SB 100.55  SB 350 emphasized the integration of demand-side tools to
reduce the need to build and run fossil-fueled plants, and required strategies to 
reduce the environmental burden of energy on “disadvantaged” communities.56 
Demand Response programs and resources “can offset the need to construct 
and dispatch polluting generation resources” often used to meet peak
energy demand.57 
In 2017 California adopted a strategy to reduce Short-Lived Climate 
Pollutants (SLCP) including methane, diesel particulates, and other forms
of black carbon that contribute to global warming and harm health such
as diesel fuel, wood burning, and kerosene.58 Black carbon ranks second
only to carbon dioxide for its climate-warming effects.59 “Although black
carbon remains in the atmosphere for only a few days, one gram of black 
carbon warms the atmosphere several hundred times more during its short 
lifetime than one gram of carbon dioxide does during 100 years.”60 
California’s goal is to reduce methane emissions by 40% compared to
2013 levels by 2030.61 These laws require the CPUC to manage and plan
energy in alignment with long-term environmental sustainability goals. 
54. S.B. 2, 2011-12, Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess., § 20(b)(2)(B) (Cal. 2011). See 
also S.B. 100, 2017-18 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1(b) (Cal. 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB100 [https://perma.cc/KQB2-5STC].
55. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701.1, Stats. 2015, ch. 547 (S.B. 350), § 30, eff. Jan. 1, 2016. 
56. Id. 
57. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 48, at 79. 
58. CARB, SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANT REDUCTION STRATEGY, Mar. 14,
2017, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/shortlived/meetings/03142017/final_slcp_report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/26D9-8CF2] [hereinafter CARB, SLCP Policy].
59.  Bond et al., supra note 2, at 5388. 
60. Arne Jacobsen, Tami C. Bond, Nicholoas L. Lam, Nathan Hultman, Black Carbon
and Kerosene Lighting: An Opportunity for Rapid Action on Climate Change and Clean
Energy for Development, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C. (UNITED STATES);
GLOBAL ECONOMY & DEVELOPMENT, at 3, Apr. 15, 2013, https://www.osti.gov/scitech/ 
biblio/22110332 [https://perma.cc/T35Y-C8DK]. 
61. CARB, SLCP Policy, supra note 58, at 24. 
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IV. GET SMART: INFUSING COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY INTO THE GRID AND TO CUSTOMERS TO 

INCREASE RELIABILITY, REDUCE COSTS, AND 

UNLEASH THE VIRTUAL POWER PLANT
 
A. Communications and Information Technology Makes 
the Grid Smart 
President George W. Bush spurred federal “Smart Grid” policies by 
signing the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA).62 The
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines the Smart 
Grid as the “two-way flow of electricity and information to create an
automated, widely distributed energy delivery network.”63 “Communications
are fundamental to all aspects of the Smart Grid, including generation,
transmission, distribution and consumption.”64 Sensors, software, and the
means to communicate two-way signals can make homes and customer 
premises negawatt generators which reduce electric load, effectively using 
“negawatts” to balance electric resources instead of increasing electric
generation by producing more megawatts to satisfy electric demand.
Communications and information technology can also detect and respond 
to electric system conditions, speed repair and recovery, increase reliability
and resiliency, and improve public safety. 
EISA enacted U.S. policy to “support the modernization of the nation’s 
electricity transmission and distribution system to maintain a reliable and 
secure electricity infrastructure that can meet future demand growth . . .”65 
Following EISA’s adoption, federal and state policy initiatives embedded 
communications and information technology throughout the energy ecosystem 
to increase electric reliability and public safety.
Since 2007 the federal and state governments and energy ratepayers
have invested billions to create and harness the benefits of a connected grid, 
investments accelerated by economic stimulus funding in 2009 from ARRA
grants. To modernize the electric grid and stimulate the economy, 200 
62. Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) (The Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007 (EISA)). 
63. FCC, Connecting America, The National Broadband Plan, at 249, https://transition.
fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/43RZ-6PRX]
(citing ELEC. POWER RES. INST. (EPRI), REPORT TO NIST ON THE SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY 
STANDARDS ROADMAP (2009), available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/InterimSmart
GridRoadmapNISTRestructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3BL-Y3CE]). 
64. Id.
 65. FERC, Smart Grid Policy, 127 FERC ¶¶ 61,139, 61,592 (May 19, 2009) (citing 
EISA, 121 Stat. 1492, § 1301). 
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electric utilities received an ARRA “Smart Grid Investment Grant from
the U.S. Department of Energy.”66 
States such as California leveraged Smart Grid investments to increase
energy data access. CPUC Decision 12-04-025 required utilities to develop 
and report on customer-facing portals to use smart grid data to improve
energy management.67 The Internet provides Smart Meter data access for 
customers, independent energy developers, academics, regulators, and others.
Unleashing customer’s energy consumption data enables energy management
and helps identify prudent energy efficiency measures.
Paper bills are still sent to many energy customers, some with smiley faces 
showing when the customer used less energy than comparable homes.
Internet-based portals communicate data in more depth to enable analysis
and action. Many customers use the Internet today to sign up for demand-
side management programs such as demand response, air conditioning cycling 
programs, to get home energy audits, participate in the Energy Savings 
Assistance Program (ESAP) for low-income Californians, learn about outages, 
and more. 
The Internet provides information to utility control room and dispatch 
operators, but is kept separate from utility controls as an “air gap” protection 
from potential hackers. California Independent System Operator (CAISO)
electric grid managers use Internet access as part of their situational awareness
and communications toolkit. FERC wholesale energy markets and CPUC
utility procurement, planning, and many dispatch functions depend on the 
open Internet.  All CAISO bidding is done on the Internet.68 
CAISO requires energy generators with a capacity of 10 MW or greater, 
who provide ancillary services (such as spin, non-spin, regulation), or serve 
as an “Eligible Intermittent Resource” to provide telemetry to communicate
66. Benlian v. PECO Energy Corp., 2016 WL 3951664, at *11 (E.D. Pa., July 20, 
2016, No. CV 15-2128) (citing Recovery Act: Smart Grid Investment Grants, ENERGY.GOV, 
http://energy.gov/oe/recovery-act-smart-grid-investment-grants [https://perma.cc/Z8X4-HX7X]). 
67. CPUC D.12-04-025, Decision Adopting Metrics to Measure the Smart Grid
Deployments of Pacific Gas & Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company and
San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Rulemaking 08-12-009, at 6, Apr. 19, 2012. 
68. CAISO, Market Optimization, BUS. PRACTICE MANUAL, MARKET OPERATIONS, July
3, 2013, at A-5,  https://bpmcm.caiso.com/BPM%20Document%20Library/Market% 20Operations/
Appendices-Market_Operations_V36_redline.pdf [https://perma.cc/VET9-8MZF] (“The
public Internet is the method of transmitting the instruction and response information between
CAISO and the SC [Scheduling Coordinator].”).
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their operational status every four seconds.69  In 2016 CAISO enabled energy
generators to communicate operational visibility through secure Internet 
channels.70 Almost every energy customer, supplier, generator, including 
Internet of Things (IoT) devices, energy market participants, as well as energy 
regulators, use the Open Internet. 
The IoT was nascent when the FCC wrote its 2009 Broadband plan. 
“IoT is a ‘network of items–each embedded with sensors–which are 
connected to the Internet.’”71 IoT takes “everyday, physical objects, connect[s] 
them to the Internet, and monitor[s] and analyze[s] data while providing 
real-time feedback.”72 Without the Internet would-be IoT connected devices
are just a thing.73 Open access to the Internet allows device connection 
and data transmission without permission or charges from ISPs.  The FCC’s 
2018 repeal of rules to safeguard Open Internet access allows ISPs to erect 
a tollbooth in the IoT’s premise or path. 
IoT proliferation illustrates the distributed energy ecosystem. We used 
to think of the home as the grid edge where people consumed electricity, 
but did not produce it. Dr. Mahmoud Daneshmand observed “the smart 
grid era is pushing sensors and, thus, visibility, into the distribution system, 
where the grid presumably “ends.” But the smart grid era is also an era in 
which distributed resources–in both utilities’ and customers’ hands–are
making the “end,” or grid’s “edge” much more difficult to define.”74  The 
Internet enables a home or a building to serve as an energy generator, or to
decrease or shift energy on demand to aid the grid, save money, prevent 
blackouts, and protect the environment by reducing GHG emissions. The
need to protect open and neutral Internet access for the energy sector is
commensurate with the distributed energy ecosystem’s reach.
B. 	Cybersecurity: Evolving Threats to Critical Infrastructure Security, 
SEC Risk and Cybersecurity Reporting Requirements
The electric grid’s interdependence with communications networks 
including the Internet underscore the imperative of cybersecurity vigilance.75
 69. CPUC, Assigned Commissioner’s Ruling Entering Workshop Report Into The Record 
And Seeking Comment, RULEMAKING 13-12-011, Oct. 26, 2016, at Attach B, CAISO 
Presentation, at slides 2–3.
 70. Id. at slide 5.
 71. Robin Kester, Demystifying the Internet of Things: Industry Impact, Standardization
Problems, and Legal Considerations, 8 ELON L. REV. 205, 206 (2016). 
72. Id.
73. Thanks to my former CPUC Legal and Water Advisor Jamie Ormond for this insight. 
74. Dr. Mahmoud Daneshmand, Big Challenges for Big Data in the Smart Grid Era, 
ECN MAG., Apr. 4, 2017, https://www.ecnmag.com/blog/2017/04/big-challenges-big­
data-smart-grid-era [https://perma.cc/4CTG-YLCC].
75. FERC, Smart Grid Policy, 128 FERC ¶¶ 61,060, 61,335 (July 16, 2009). 
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In 2014, NERC promulgated “critical infrastructure protection guidelines 
referred to as CIP V5, which became binding in July 2016.”76 The 
importance of protecting the electric grid’s physical infrastructure was
highlighted by the shooting of electric equipment after assailants cut nearby 
communications lines at the Metcalf substation near San Jose, California 
in April 2014.77 FERC issued Order No. 802 in 2014 to assess and protect 
physical assets that constitute the bulk-electric power system.78 
The Internet enables protection of physical assets through sensors and 
video technology. Internet-enabled cameras and sensors monitor energy 
facilities including generators, providing visibility into grid conditions, 
and facilitating response to physical threats.  The Internet enables the public
to monitor and communicate information about grid threats including fire 
or other dangers. Paired with software analytics and artificial intelligence, 
live video can be a powerful tool to detect grid threats or conditions. 
The FCC’s decision to allow paid prioritization rested in part on AT&T’s
assertion that paid priority would not typically degrade functions such as
email, software updates, and cached video.79 Yet, many utility facility physical
security and fire condition monitoring systems require access to live, not
cached video.80 The FCC’s paid prioritization proposal would allow degradation
of live video as a side-effect of priority deals, without consideration of its
implications for critical infrastructure, another example of the Order’s
failings under the APA.
President Obama in February 2013 directed NIST to lead the development 
of a Cybersecurity Framework to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure,
and facilitate information sharing about cybersecurity risks.81  In July 2016 
76. Id.; NERC, CIP Standards, http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/CIPStandards.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7WR4-VL5C] (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
77. Carolyn Tyler, PG&E announces $250K reward for substation sabatoge info, 
ABC7 NEWS, https://abc7news.com/archive/9500018/ [https://perma.cc/W85D-G3AE]
(“It was just after 1:30 a.m. last April when someone slipped into the Metcalf Substation.
Fiber optic phone lines were cut and a rifle shot up transformers. More than $15 million 
worth of damage was done.”) (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
78.  Order No. 802, 149 FERC ¶ 61,140 (2014) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 40). 
79. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 258 (citing AT&T Comments 
at 44–45). 
80. See e.g., Eric Olson, Protecting the Power Grid, SECURITY INFOWATCH, Dec.
15, 2017, http://www.security info watch.com/article/123822710/protecting-the-power­
grid [https://perma.cc/U5QR-4BUG] (describing the use of video analytics including live
camera video to protect the power grid’s facility physical security).
81. Exec. Order No. 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11739, 2013 WL 596302 (Pres.), July 12, 2013. 
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President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41 to coordinate
federal response to cyber security incidents.  PPD-41 requires assessment
of cyber threat risks “to an entity, our national security, foreign relations, the
broader economy, public confidence, civil liberties, or the public health and
safety of the American people.”82 
President Trump recognized the crucial role of the open internet to the 
energy sector in his May 11, 2017 Executive Order on Cybersecurity and 
Critical Infrastructure.83  That Executive Order declared “the policy of the
executive branch to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure 
internet that fosters efficiency, innovation, communication, and economic 
prosperity, while respecting privacy and guarding against disruption, fraud, 
and theft.”84 
As part of its risk assessment and alert system, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) reported 31 cyber-attacks “on the energy sector” in 2011, 
and 161 cyber-attacks in 2014.85  In October 2017, the DHS and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warned “that the nuclear, energy, aviation, 
water and critical manufacturing industries have been targeted along with
government entities in [cyber] attacks dating back to at least May.”86  DHS 
issued a cybersecurity alert on March 15, 2018 reporting that the Russian 
government was targeting energy and other critical infrastructure facilities.87 
DHS reported “Russian government cyber actors” gained remote access
into energy sector networks through malware and spear phishing attacks, 
and in June 2018 informed utility executives that Russians hackers had stolen 
hundreds of credentials to penetrate “air gapped” energy utility networks 
designed to be isolated from the open Internet.88 These attacks underscore 
the need for vigilance to ward off hackers, intrusions, and actions that
compromise data and operations. Neither DHS, the FCC, FERC, nor 
energy operators have recognized that malicious actors may seek to buy paid 
82. The White House, Presidential Policy Directive–United States Cyber Incident 
Coordination, July 26, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/26/ 
presidential-policy-directive-united-states-cyber-incident [https://perma.cc/V3E9-R2Y7].
83. President Trump Executive Order on Cybersecurity, supra note 26. 
84. Id.
 85. Stein, Regulating Reliability supra note 34, at 1229–30. 
 86. Jim Finkle, U.S. warns public about attacks on energy, industrial firms, REUTERS, 
Oct. 21, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-energy/u-s-warns-public-about- 
attacks-on-energy-industrial-firms-idUSKBN1CQ0IN [https://perma.cc/Z927-TMH9].
87. UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM (US-CERT), U.S.
DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT CYBER ACTIVITY TARGETING ENERGY 
AND OTHER CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS, Alert (TA18-074A), Mar. 16, 2018,
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A [https://perma.cc/MM4C-ZN3D].
88. Id.; Rebecca Smith, Russian Hackers Reach U.S. Utility Control Rooms,
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priority, or hack accounts with Internet priority, to compromise energy and 
critical infrastructure use of the Internet. 
Many cybersecurity warnings focus on hackers, unauthorized intrusions, 
and “authorized users” who exceed their permission.89  CIPA requires focus
on the consequences of threats to critical infrastructure including cybersecurity,90 
not the actor. The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order allows ISPs to engage in
paid priority deals even if doing so delays other traffic, with no safeguards 
for any users. Paid priority deals raise cyber security risks DHS, critical
infrastructure sector operators, federal and state regulators, businesses,
and those dependent on the Internet must examine and address.
California Senate Bill 822 recognizes that “[a]most every sector of California’s 
economy, democracy, and society is dependent on the open and neutral 
Internet that supports vital functions regulated under the police power of
the state,” including “Utility services and infrastructure.”91  I appreciated the 
opportunity to recommend to the bill’s sponsor, Senator Wiener, and his staff,
language in SB 822 recognizing the importance of the Internet to critical
infrastructure services, the economy, businesses, and other activities regulated 
by the state’s police power.92 
The cybersecurity and operational risk of paid priority to Internet users 
make net neutrality’s repeal a reportable investment risk under SEC rules. 
Firms with SEC reporting requirements must disclose significant investment 
risks including cybersecurity risks. 
The SEC defines Cybersecurity as “the body of technologies, processes
and practices designed to protect networks, systems, computers, programs
and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access.”93 The SEC issued 
89. See, e.g., Trope & Humes, supra note 37, at 659 (“as “smarter” devices with software 
flaws are deployed that create two-way communication channels and nodes that provide 
adversaries vulnerable points and attack vectors.”).
90. Bagley, supra note 22, at 51. 
91. Communications: broadband Internet access service, CAL. S.B. 822, § 1(a)(3)
(as passed by the California Senate, May 30, 2018, under consideration in the California 
Assembly), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB822 
[https://perma.cc/Y2YX-A62B].
92. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (states have authority under the police 
power to “legislate with regard to protection of the lives, limbs health, comfort, and quiet 
of all persons.”). 
93. SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2: Cybersecurity, 
Oct. 13, 2011, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm [https://
perma.cc/N3SR-YFLU] [hereinafter SEC, CF Disclosure Guidance]; (citing cybersecurity,
WHATIS?COM, available at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/cybersecurity.html [https:// 
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cybersecurity risk disclosure guidelines in 2011.94 The SEC requires that
“a company must disclose enough information to meet SEC requirements 
and investors’ needs, but does not have to give would-be hackers a roadmap
to the company’s technological weak spots.”95 
The SEC’s 2011 guidance on disclosure of cybersecurity risks notes that 
“Cyber attacks may also be carried out in a manner that does not require
gaining unauthorized access, such as by causing denial-of-service attacks
on websites.”96 The SEC noted that the objective of a cybersecurity attack 
is not always financial or to steal data.  “Cyber attacks may also be directed
at disrupting the operations of registrants or their business partners,” the 
SEC warned.97 
During the past few years, SEC staff sent comments to registrants in
industries reported as the target of cyber-attacks, and requested firms “to
provide a separate discussion of the risks posed to the registrant’s operations 
from its dependence on technology or to the registrant’s business, operations
or reputation by cyber-attacks . . . .”98  SEC Chairman Jay Clayton’s September 
20, 2017 statement highlighted the increasing types and number of cybersecurity
threats, and underscored the importance of cybersecurity for firms subject
to SEC regulation.99  Yet, Chairman Clayton’s statement failed to recognized 
the cybersecurity and investment risks posed by allowing unregulated paid 
Internet priority. 
Following the FCC’s January 2018 repeal of net neutrality rules, no
government qualification process will be used to decide who can buy paid
Internet priority. Unregulated paid priority is not like the “TSA Pre-Check 
lane” that requires government authorization before signup is completed. 
The 2015 Open Internet rules allowed ISPs such as AT&T to offer “qualified
emergency service providers” to apply through a U.S. Homeland Security
Application for limited call and data prioritization for communications AT&T 
perma.cc/4WCZ-ZQJ3]. See also cybersecurity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam- 
webster.com/dictionary/cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/7XLG-V9FN].). 
94. Jay Fishman & Mark Nelson, Hot Topics in SEC Filings 2017: Regulatory Roll-
Backs, Fintech, Cyber, and Blue Sky Offerings, FED. SEC. L. REP. P. 2774208 (May 2017). 
95. SEC, CF Disclosure Guidance, supra note 93; Howard M. Privette, D. Scott 
Carlton, Sarah Kelly-Kilgore, The SEC Guidance on Cybersecurity Measures for Public 
Companies, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2014, at 14, 18, https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/ 
lal-back-issues/2014-issues/september2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB32-E5YK].
96. SEC, CF Disclosure Guidance, supra note 93. 
97. Id.
98. Spencer G. Feldman, The SEC Is Increasingly Eliciting Risk Factor Disclosure 
Describing Cybersecurity Risks and Past Cyber Attacks from All Public Companies, SECURITIES
LAW BLOG, Nov. 2, 2017, https://www.olshanlaw.com/blogs-Securities-Law-Blog,the-sec-is­
increasingly-eliciting-risk-factor [https://perma.cc/5GAK-3X3Q].
99. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, Statement on Cybersecurity, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, Sept. 20, 2017, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton- 
2017-09-20 [https://perma.cc/4C3W-LL2U].
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describes as “not originating from or traversing the Internet.”100  In contrast,
the FCC’s 2018 Internet Freedom Order gives ISPs complete discretion
over who can buy priority, and how and when it will be triggered. 
Paid priority deals would be bounded only by other applicable laws such 
as U.S. sanctions, antitrust, and consumer protection laws. “Sanctions form a
limited deterrent as many sanctions only apply to named individuals or 
organizations or those working on behalf of a sanctioned government.”101 
“ISPs could believe in good faith they are selling U.S. Internet priority to 
persons or entities not subject to sanctions,”102 but later find the purchaser
was set up to attempt to circumvent sanctions. 
While ISPs may not intend to disrupt other business operations through 
paid priority delays and network management, some paid priority buyers 
may harbor nefarious motives unknown to the ISP. Moreover, intent is not 
the relevant standard when examining cyber-risk.  ISP priority deals that 
delay or degrade other traffic may have consequences similar to a denial­
of-service attack characterized by the inability to access data or complete
transmissions.  The increased risk of ISP-induced delay due to paid priority, 
and the lack of safeguards for other Internet users or content providers
appear to constitute reportable cybersecurity risks under SEC Item 503(c) 
for firms whose operations materially depend upon the Internet. 
Cybersecurity risks also require action by critical infrastructure sector
operators and regulators.103 CPUC Decision 14-12-025 requires utilities
to file General Rate Case (GRC) applications that assess risks and offer a
plan to mitigate them.  Utilities must manage and mitigate risk during their 
100. Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 30–31 (citing AT&T, 
Wireless Priority (providing priority for calls from Emergency Agencies available through
an application from the U.S. Homeland Security site), https://www.wireless.att.com/business 
center/business-programs/government/wireless-priority.jsp [https://perma.cc/54V5-BACN];
AT&T, AT&T Dynamic Traffic Management−Public Safety (allowing public safety agencies 
to “prioritize their mission-critical data traffic on the AT&T-owned domestic 4G LTE network,”
a service “available only to qualified local, state and federal emergency management
organizations (such as police and fire departments). The service is not available for unlimited 
plans and “does not apply to your [public safety agency] data traffic originated on or traversing
over the Internet”), https://www.corp.att.com/stateandlocal/docs/ADTM-Public_Safety.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2TJ-28KR]. These services were offered under the 2015 Open Internet
Order’s exemption of “specialized services” from the net neutrality rules.
101. Id. at 55. 
102. Id. at 26. 
103.  42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). 
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daily operations.104 California Public Utilities Code (CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE) § 
961 (d)(1)  requires gas corporations to “[i]dentify and minimize hazards and 
systemic risks in order to minimize accidents, explosions, fires, and dangerous 
conditions, and protect the public and the gas corporation workforce.”  The
CPUC must ensure that utilities operate safely and reliably, and may ask for 
utility records and conduct investigations to address and mitigate risks to 
public safety, reliability, and the environment.105 
PG&E, a California utility that serves 5.3 million electric accounts and 
4.4. million natural gas accounts, conducted a materiality assessment as part 
of its corporate sustainability report.106 The Materiality Matrix identifies 
eighteen issues PG&E deems material to the utility’s long-term sustainability, 
each one of which is enabled by or depends in part on the open Internet: Public
Safety, Non-Renewable Energy Supply, Renewable Energy, Rate Structure 
and Affordability, Environmental Footprint, Customer Engagement, Customer 
Energy Management, Infrastructure Reliability and Resilience, Distributed 
Generation, Greenhouse Gas and other Emissions, Water, Enabling 
Technologies, Community and Economic Vitality, Public Policy Engagement, 
Cybersecurity and Data Protection, Employee Engagement, Workforce Safety, 
and Workforce Planning.107  The enabling technologies PG&E identified– 
those related to the smart grid, energy storage, electric vehicles and customer
energy usage data–each depend in part on the open Internet.108  PG&E’s
materiality assessment highlights the need to address and report under SEC 
rules and as part of its CPUC risk assessment, the risks to electric and gas 
operations from the FCC’s repeal of net neutrality rules.
104. CPUC D.14-12-025, DECISION INCORPORATING A RISK-BASED DECISION-MAKING
FRAMEWORK INTO THE RATE CASE PLAN AND MODIFYING APPENDIX A OF DECISION 07-07­
004, 2-3,5, Dec. 4, 2014 (requiring utilities to file General Rate Case (GRC) applications 
to address and mitigate risks, and to act to manage and mitigate risk during their daily
operations); CPUC D. 16-08-018, INTERIM DECISION ADOPTING THE MULTI-ATTRIBUTE 
APPROACH (OR UTILITY EQUIVALENT FEATURES) AND DIRECTING UTILITIES TO TAKE STEPS
TOWARD A MORE UNIFORM RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, at 5 (Application 15-05­
002) (Aug. 18, 2016). 
105. See CAL.PUB.UTIL.CODE § 451 (“Every public utility shall furnish and maintain such
adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities,
including telephone facilities, as defined in Section 54.1 of the Civil Code, as are necessary to 
promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, employees, and the 
public.”); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (“The commission may supervise and regulate every
public utility in the State and may do all things, whether specifically designated in this part
or in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power 
and jurisdiction.”) 
106. PG&E, TOGETHER, BUILDING A BETTER CALIFORNIA, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2017, at 21, http://www.pgecorp.com/corp_responsibility/
reports/2017/assets/PGE_CRSR_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZ7M-R5RR].
107. Id. at 6. 
108. Id. at 7. 
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Use of Internet-enabled technologies to manage energy operations and
deploy resources has grown tremendously since 2000.  FERC’s Order 745
adopted in 2011 authorized demand response to participate in wholesale 
energy markets, improve system reliability, and reduce the environmental
impact of energy use.  As discussed below, deployment of demand response
resources is at risk from ISP gatekeeping behavior authorized by the FCC’s
2018 Internet Freedom Order. 
V. DEPLOYING NEGAWATTS; FERC ORDER 745 ENABLES
 




Demand Response has grown as a resource in wholesale energy markets 
since CAISO petitioned FERC in 2000 during the California Electricity Crisis
to establish a tariff to allow load reduction to be offered and compensated
as an energy resource.109 FERC approved the CAISO demand response tariff 
as California faced market manipulation.  FERC later found that Enron
traders encouraged power plants to shut down for maintenance to create 
artificial energy shortages that drove up prices, and other evidence of market 
manipulation.110 
In 2008, through Order No. 719, FERC ordered RTOs and ISOs to amend
market rules to permit an aggregator of retail customers to bid retail customer
demand response into wholesale markets.111 FERC’s Order 719 allows an
exception for states whose laws or regulations do not permit retail customer 
participation in wholesale markets through demand response aggregators.112 
This order also allowed the participation of energy efficiency resources,
projects “designed to achieve a continuous . . . reduction in electric energy
 109. California Independent System Operator Corp., Order Conditionally Accepting 
for Filing Tariff Revisions, 91 FERC ¶ 61,256 (2000), available at https://www.ferc.gov/
whats-new/comm-meet/2010/121610/E-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGS9-WDWX]; PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C., Order Accepting Tariff Sheets as Modified, 95 FERC ¶ 61,306
(2001), available at http://www.energymarketers.com/Documents/Order_Approving_Load_
Response_Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ3E-V3FC]. 
110. See Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 462 F.3d at 1036–41 (providing a 
history of the events leading up to, during, and the regulatory proceedings and litigation
following the California Electricity Crisis of 2000-2001 through 2006); see State of California, 
ex rel. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of the State of California, 160 FERC ¶ 63,010 (July 28, 
2017) (providing background on the California Energy Crisis market manipulation findings).
111. Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 
719, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281, at 154 (2008). 
112. Id.
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consumption at the End-Use Customer’s retail site.”113  FERC Order 719 was
based on the Energy Policy Act of 2005’s national policy that “unnecessary 
barriers to demand response participation in energy, capacity and ancillary 
service markets shall be eliminated.”114 
In 2011 FERC adopted Order 745, authorizing demand response to participate 
as a resource in wholesale energy markets.115 “FERC Order No. 745 requires 
market operators to pay the same price to Demand Response providers for 
conserving energy as to generators for producing it, so long as a “net benefits
test,” which ensures that accepted bids actually save consumers money, is
met.”116 Demand response resources can be deployed through the Internet
without environmental or siting review, or decade long proceedings to 
build power plants. 
As the Supreme Court explains in F.E.R.C. v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, 
generator bids are compensated based on the concept of “marginal pricing,” 
what it would cost to procure the next unit of energy:
Operators accept the generators’ bids in order of cost (least expensive first) until
they satisfy the LSEs’ [load service entity such as a utility] total demand. The
price of the last unit of electricity purchased is then paid to every supplier whose
bid was accepted, regardless of its actual offer; and the total cost is split among
the LSEs in proportion to how much energy they have ordered. So, for example, 
suppose that at 9 a.m. on August 15 four plants serving Washington, D.C.–
can each produce some amount of electricity for, respectively, $10/unit, $20/unit,
$30/unit, and $40/unit. And suppose that LSEs’ demand at that time and place is
met after the operator accepts the three cheapest bids. The first three generators
would then all receive $30/unit. That amount is (think back to Econ 101) the 
marginal cost–i.e., the added cost of meeting another unit of demand–which is
the price an efficient market would produce.117 
The cost for the bids is known as the “locational marginal cost” or LMP. 
FERC Order 745 imposes two conditions on demand response bidders 
to “ensure that a bid to use less electricity provides the same value to the 
wholesale market as a bid to make more.”118 “First, a demand response
bidder must have “the capability to provide the service” offered; it must, 
that is, actually be able to reduce electricity use and thereby obviate the
operator’s need to secure additional power.”119 “Second, paying LMP for
a demand response bid “must be cost-effective,” as measured by a standard 
113. Id. at 154, ¶ 59 (citing see MISO Tariff, Attachment UU (EERs Measurement 
& Verification Procedures); ISO-NE Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, I.2 Rules 





Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 48, at 77. 
F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. 760, 763 (as revised Jan. 28, 2016). 
Id. (citing FERC Order 745, § 35.28(g)(1)(v)). 
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called “the net benefits test.” That test makes certain that accepting a
lower-priced demand response bid over a higher-priced supply bid will 
actually save LSEs (i.e., wholesale purchasers) money.”120 As discussed 
infra section VII (3), the FCC’s decision to allow ISPs to engage in paid
prioritization of Internet traffic based on their private deals, even if it degrades 
other traffic, raises risks of non-compliance with both conditions for
demand response bidding.121 
F.E.R.C. v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n. found FERC Order 745 within 
FERC jurisdiction to ensure electric reliability and “just and reasonable” 
rates in wholesale electricity markets.122 “Wholesale demand response,”
Justice Kagan observed in writing for the majority, “pays consumers for
commitments to curtail their use of power, so as to curb wholesale rates
and prevent grid breakdowns.”123 
Joel Eisen characterizes FERC Order 745 as consistent with “FERC’s 
mandate to ensure the reliability of the wholesale power system” by adopting 
incentives to “adjust regional supply and demand for electricity to ensure 
that rates are just and reasonable.”124  Demand response contributes to lower
energy prices, decreases the risk of blackouts and other service problems, and
enhances reliability in the wholesale electricity market, the Court majority 
concluded.125 
In December 2017 FERC recognized “to the extent possible, energy 
efficiency solutions should be able to compete on an equal footing with
demand response, generation, and transmission solutions.”126  Demand 
response and energy efficiency have been critical tools for California’s
efforts to enhance electric reliability, reduce GHGs, and save system and
ratepayer costs.  The Internet has been integral to enabling demand response 






 124. Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1838 (2016). 
125.  FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. at 768–69.
126.  161 FERC ¶ 61,245, Dec. 1, 2017, at ¶ 60. 
 27
SANDOVAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/8/2018 3:31 PM     
 
 
   
 
















   
 
   
  
    
 
     





    
VI. DATA FUEL SECURE: INTERNET-ENABLED DEMAND RESPONSE,
RENEWABLES, AND COORDINATION PROMOTE 

RELIABILITY, SAVE SYSTEM COSTS, REDUCE 

GHGS, AND PREVENT BLACKOUTS
 
A. Reliability, Resilience, and FERC’s Proposal to Pay More to 

Generators with Ninety Days of Fuel on Hand 

With the asserted goal of improving electric grid resiliency and reliability 
FERC issued a NOPR on October 10, 2017 proposing a Grid Resiliency 
Pricing Rule.127  FERC’s Grid Reliability NOPR cited the “premature” 
retirement of several coal-fired and nuclear plants as the basis for its concerns
that grid resiliency is threatened.128  The NOPR expressed concern about
the ability to “withstand major fuel supply disruptions caused by natural or
man-made disasters and, in those critical times, continue to provide electric
energy, capacity, and essential grid reliability services”129 or provide superior 
reliability benefits. The Rhodium Group’s analysis of energy disturbance 
reports submitted to DOE found that fuel supply issues were a minor cause 
of outages over the past five years.130  The Group’s analysis showed that
a vast majority of outages resulted from severe weather events such as
hurricanes.131  FERC’s Grid Resiliency NOPR cited the February 2014 Polar
Vortex as an example of the incidents that allegedly justified its proposal.
However, the NOPR neglected to mention that some coal-piles froze during
the Polar Vortex, rendering certain coal-fired power plants unavailable.132 
FERC’s Grid Resiliency NOPR proposed a tariff to compensate the “full 
cost” of energy generators with 90-days fuel on hand, “to provide electric 
energy, capacity, and essential grid reliability services.”133 The NOPR
127. Catherine Sandoval, Comments, FERC Grid Resiliency Docket No. RM18-1­
000, Dec. 8, 2017, at 8 [hereinafter Sandoval, FERC Grid Resiliency Comments] (citing
FERC, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, NOPR, supra note 10, at 46,941–42). 
128. FERC, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, NOPR, supra note 10, at 46,941–42.
 129. Id.
 130. TREVOR HOUSER, JOHN LARSEN AND PETER MARSTERS, THE RHODIUM GROUP,
THE REAL ELECTRICITY RELIABILITY CRISIS, Oct. 3, 2017, http://rhg.com/notes/the-real­
electricity-reliability-crisis [https://perma.cc/8DRY-HTKX] (“Between 2012 and 2016, there 
were roughly 3.4 billion customer-hours impacted by major electricity disruptions. Of that, 
2,382 hours, or 0.00007% of the total, was due to fuel supply problems (Figure 1). Interestingly,
2,333 of those customer hours were due to one event in Northern Minnesota in 2014. And it 
involved a coal-fired power plant.”). 
131. Id.
 132. Amory B. Lovins, Does “Fuel on Hand” Make Coal and Nuclear Power Plants 
More Secure, FORBES, May 1, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/amorylovins/2017/05/01/
does-fuel-on-hand-make-coal-and-nuclear-power-plants-more-valuable/#2f1f48c76902 
[https://perma.cc/A6KS-M7BP].
133. FERC, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, NOPR, supra note 10, at 46,942. 
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characterized coal-fired and nuclear power plants as “fuel secure”134 but
offered no analysis to support its classification of such plants as “fuel secure.”
Neither did the NOPR define “premature retirements.”
FERC rejected the Grid Resiliency NOPR on January 8, 2018 based on 
the proposal’s failure to show under FPA Section 206 that existing ISO and
RTO tariffs are unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,
and that the proposal meets that standard.135 FERC directed ISOs and RTOs 
to submit reports by March 8, 2018, examining how grid resiliency should 
be defined and assessed, and recommending additional steps to promote 
resiliency.136 Those reports are subject to public comment for analysis in 
the FERC Docket No. AD18-7-000.137  White House Press Secretary Sarah 
Huckabee Sanders reported on June 1, 2018 that President Trump has ordered
the DOE to take immediate steps to stall the retirement of coal and nuclear
plants,”138 although no order has been officially signed as of August 16, 2018. 
The procedural flaws and substantive shortcomings of FERC’s Grid 
Resiliency NOPR and President Trump’s proposal to require energy ratepayers 
to pay to stall coal and nuclear retirements are beyond the scope of this Article’s 
analysis.  However, this Article informs those debates by underscoring the 
role of Internet-enabled resources and net neutrality to energy reliability
and resiliency, cybersecurity, and other systemic threats such as the effects of
climate change. 
B. The San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant’s Outage is Mitigated by 

Demand Response, Distributed Energy Resources,
 




California’s experience with the abrupt closure of the San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station (SONGs) illustrates nuclear power outage and reliability
risks that persist even when generators have 90-days of fuel on hand. SONGs 
closed in January 2012 after several steam generator tubes deteriorated, causing
 134. Id.
 135. FERC, NOPR Termination and Grid Resiliency Rulemaking, supra note 11, at ¶ 14.
136. Id. at ¶ 18.
137. Id. at ¶ 19.
138. Brad Plumer, Trump Orders a Lifeline for Struggling Coal and Nuclear Plants, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/climate/trump-coal-nuclear-
power.html [https://perma.cc/2UFG-HHBZ]. 
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a leak at the station.139  Between 2002 and 2011, SONGS produced
approximately 18 percent of total electricity generation in the Southern
California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) CAISO 
zones.140 SCE decided in mid-2013 to close the plant to avoid the more
than $1 million a day the utility was spending to keep the plant in a state 
of readiness to reopen upon regulatory approval.141 
After the SONGs outage in January 2012, SCE and SDG&E upgraded
energy infrastructure, improved grid operator visibility, and used the Internet
to facilitate energy demand reduction. The CPUC ordered SCE and SDG&E 
to partner with community-based organizations (CBOs) in 2012-2014 to
deploy trusted local messengers to communicate to Southern California’s
diverse communities about the need to save power.142 Many CBOs used 
the Internet to organize events and convey energy conservation information
to a range of communities.143 Both SDG&E and SCE reported that their
demand response efforts were successful in reaching and educating customers 
about the importance of reducing energy usage.144 
In April 2012, the CPUC adopted Decision (D.) 12-04-045 to promote 
Demand Response as an IOU energy resource that complements energy 
bids into FERC wholesale markets. The CPUC also ordered transmission 
139. Sandoval, FERC Grid Resiliency Comments, supra note 127, at 29–30 (citing CPUC
D.14-11-040, Decision Approving Settlement Agreement As Amended And Restated By
Settling Parties, (OII 12-10-013) Nov. 20, 2014, at 1-2). 
140. Id. at 30 (citing U.S. Energy Information Administration (USEIA), San Onofre 
Nuclear Outage Contributes to Southern California’s Changing Generation Profile, Nov.
4, 2012, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=8770 [https://perma.cc/8JDP­
LDEL] (“Between 2002 and 2011, SONGS generated an average of 16,218,635 megawatt 
hours of electricity each year” representing “18% of the total electricity generation in the 
Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric California ISO zones during 
this period.”)). 
141. Id. (citing See CPUC D.14-11-040, at 1–2; Scott Cunningham, Southern California 
Edison Announces Plans to Retire San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Southern California 
Edison, June 7, 2013, https://www.songscommunity.com/news/releases/southern-california­
edison-announces-plans-to-retire-san-onofre-nuclear-generating-station [https://perma.cc/
S34C-YFJD]). 
142. Sandoval, FERC Grid Resiliency Comments, supra note 127, at 31 (citing CPUC
D.13-04-017, Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Company (U-902-M) for Approval 
of Demand Response Program Augmentations and Associated Funding for the Years 2013
through 2014, at 17, Apr. 18, 2013, http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/
M064/K342/64342913.PDF [https://perma.cc/CR38-5UDN] (The “2012 Flex Alert Campaign 
results show that utilizing community-based organizations increased the number of customers,
especially from hard-to-reach communities, benefiting from the knowledge provided.”).
143. Id. at 32. 
144. Id. (citing CPUC D.13-04-017 at 24–25 (“The 2012 campaign targeted customers 
in the SONGS affected area, educating them on conservation steps to take during hot
weather . . . SCE states that a study performed in August 2012 indicated that more than
half of residential customers and one-third of small business customers made “a lot of effort
during peak hours to reduce their energy consumption.”). 
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system upgrades completed in 2013 and other facility investments to facilitate 
the flow of electricity in the Los Angeles and Orange County basins.145 
The CPUC commented in opposition to FERC’s Grid Resiliency NOPR, 
that in “the aftermath of a major leak at the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage
facility and the unplanned closure of [SONGs]–California was able to rely
on its diverse resource mix to meet demand despite the loss of large legacy
infrastructure.”146 A diverse resource mix including Internet-enabled energy
resources and systems also improved California’s energy resiliency and 
reliability during the 2014 Polar Vortex which the NOPR cited to justify the
Grid Resiliency proposal.147 
C. The Polar Vortex: Demand Response, Renewables,  
and Internet-Enabled Platforms Save the Sunny 
California Polar Vortex Day, 2014 
As the Polar Vortex, a clash of arctic and warmer air masses, pushed 
freezing temperatures into Canada, the U.S. Midwest, and east on February 
6, 2014, natural gas prices surged throughout the U.S.148  That morning,
SoCalGas which provides natural gas services to Southern California including 
San Diego and Los Angeles, informed CAISO that natural gas storage
levels were near all-time lows as higher natural gas prices outside of
California led to higher storage withdrawals.”149 The Polar Vortex in the
east left Sunny California with insufficient natural gas supplies to fuel its 
natural-gas fired electric power plants as traders chased higher prices
eastward. 
CPUC rules in effect at the time largely allowed gas sellers to avoid 
fulfilling contracts to California buyers like electric power plant operators.
The CPUC modified its rules in 2015 and 2016 to improve coordination 
145. Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Commissioner, CPUC, Safe, Reliable Service at Just 
and Reasonable Rates: Priorities, Challenges, and Opportunities, Remarks at Stanford Law 
School (Apr. 25, 2013), at 9, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/ 
Content/About_Us/Organization/Commissioners/Catherine_Sandoval/Stanford_2013_Pr
esentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/S798-Z84S].
146. CPUC, Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing, at 39 (Docket No. RM18-1-000) 
Oct. 23, 2017 [hereinafter, CPUC, Comments, Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing].
147. Sandoval, FERC Grid Resiliency Comments, supra note 127, at 33. 
148. Howard Gugel & James Merlo, NERC, POLAR VORTEX REV., Sept. 2014, https://
www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/January%202014%20Polar%20Vortex%20Review/Polar_Vortex
_Review_29_Sept_2014_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/JHX6-NAVL]. 
149. CPUC, Comments, Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing, supra note 146, at 35.
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between natural gas suppliers, IOUs, regulators, and demand needs to prevent 
shortages that could threaten California energy reliability.150 
CAISO reported that before 7 a.m. on February 6, 2014, “SoCalGas 
contacted the ISO with concerns over generating units’ gas usage rates.
The ISO also received forced outage notifications from generating units
based on gas usage limitations imposed by SoCalGas.”151 SoCalGas and 
ISO then directed all generating units located in the southern portion of its
system not to increase their natural gas usage rates, while ISO dispatched other
generating units and intertie resources to make up for the loss of electric
supply.152 
During the Polar Vortex peak, CAISO issued demand response calls to 
reduce energy consumption while it sought other energy resources.  “CAISO
requested demand response from the public through a state-wide ‘Flex Alert’
to reduce electric and gas use to avoid blackouts, while curtailing the operation 
of a gas-fired power plant in Southern California.”153 “[CA]ISO issued a
grid warning notice at 13:00, explaining the gas use constraint; this grid 
warning notice also encouraged market participants to offer additional 
energy and ancillary service bids.”154 
As the day unfolded and natural gas supplies remained short of the 
anticipated peak demand in the evening (from 4:00 PM to 9:00 PM), “ISO . . .
contacted utility distribution companies to request that they activate their 
interruptible load” and requested that “utilities call for demand response 
programs with consumers that have contracts for demand response.”155 
The Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC) Reliability Coordinator 
150. CPUC D.15-06-004, Decision Granting Application Of Southern California Gas
Company and San Diego Gas & Electric Company For Low Operational Flow Order and
Emergency Flow Order Requirements, June 11, 2015, http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/Published 
Docs/Published/G000/M156/K155/156155528.docx [https://perma.cc/QC6K-CY7J]; CPUC 
Resolution G-3511, Dec. 7, 2015, http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/
M156/K208/156208939.PDF [https://perma.cc/TM44-7MUF]; CPUC D.16-12-016, Decision
Granting The Joint Petition For Modification Of Decision 16-06-039, Dec. 1, 2016, https:// 
www.socalgas.com/regulatory/tariffs/tm2/pdf/4997-A.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL5J-457S].
151. CAISO, Gas Events and Market Results of Feb. 6, 2014, TECHNICAL BULL. 
(May 2014), at 14, https://www.caiso.com/Documents/TechnicalBulletinGasEvents_Market 
Results_Feb6_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JUZ-PRAX] [hereinafter CAISO, Gas Events 
and Market Results of Feb. 6, 2014].
152. Id. at 14–15. 
153. Written Statement of Commissioner Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Commissioner, 
California Public Utilities Commission, Before the Congressional Forum on Net Neutrality, 
Hosted by Congresswoman Doris O. Matsui, Sept 24, 2014, at 36 [hereinafter Commissioner 
Sandoval, 2015 Open Internet Ex Parte Comments].
154. CAISO, Gas Events and Market Results of Feb. 6, 2014, supra note 151, at 16. 
155. Id.
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issued Energy Emergency Alerts to reduce energy consumption in regions 
interconnected to CAISO, freeing up export resources.156 
Several factors saved the day in California as the Polar Vortex wreaked
havoc on the grid.  Demand response programs deployed a virtual power 
plant to reduce energy consumption.157  Demand response produced 800
megawatts (MW) of load reduction “during the evening ramp and peak of
the electric demand . . . relieving pressure on the supply” in California on 
February 6, 2014.158  This level of demand response is more than two and 
a half times the size of a 300 MW peaker plant.159 CAISO reported demand 
response and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) are well-tailored to address
local needs in areas where gas-fired power plants were short on gas.160 
Internet-supported communications facilitated Demand Response and
coordination between market participants, the public, WECC, generators, 
utilities, and market regulators. “CAISO uses many Internet-based channels 
and social media to communicate with the public, participants in the CAISO 
market, regulators and others including Twitter, Facebook, RSS feeds, Google 
Plus, and YouTube. CAISO encourages those who read its urgent messages 
to pass it on with a ‘Thanks for re-posting!’”161 
CAISO reported that three main factors forestalled blackouts in California 
during the Polar Vortex peak: “demand response help[ed] to shave the
load across the evening ramp and peak, ii) the wind generation picked up 
just right around the evening peak, and iii) given the projected tight conditions
for the peak the ISO secured more interties to position the system for the
evening peak.”162  Renewables also played a significant role in California
during the Polar Vortex.  “In the late afternoon, wind generation output increased 
as evening peak electric demand occurred, . . . further reduc[ing] the need




 159. Cf. Barry Cassell, New 800-MW natural gas-fired power plant begins operation
early, POWER ENGINEERING, May 17, 2013, https://www.power-eng.com/articles/2013/05/new­
800-mw-natural-gas-fired-power-plant-begins-operations-early.html [https://perma.cc/ 
GVT5-E9B2] (“Eight units with quick-starting and fast-ramping capability make the project a
perfect fit for summer peak seasons, while also backing up California’s growing solar and
wind farms that literally surround the plant” and providing 800-MW of capacity). 
160. CAISO, Gas Events and Market Results of Feb. 6, 2014, supra note 151, at 16. 
161. Commissioner Sandoval, 2015 Open Internet Ex Parte Comments, supra note 153, 
at 36.
 162. CAISO, Gas Events and Market Results of Feb. 6, 2014, supra note 154, at 18. 
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pressure on the overall supply side.”163  This combination of resources “resulted
in less demand and more supply available that help[ed] manage the gas 
supply limitations and that also resulted in the system clearing at a lower 
level in the supply stack.”164 
The CPUC’s June 2016 adoption of the Interconnection Decision I 
authored–D.16-06-052–increases the ability to integrate, manage, and dispatch 
renewables including wind, solar, and storage.165 That decision facilitates 
deployment of “Smart inverters”166 which convert direct current (DC) from
solar arrays into the alternating current (AC) used in the electric distribution 
system. Smart inverters communicate between the DER, the utility, and the 
grid operator. Each in turn communicates to generators, customers, and 
providers throughout the grid using the Internet. Smart inverters can provide 
a variety of grid services, and are mandatory for new solar and wind systems
installed in California after September 8, 2017.167 
The Union of Concerned Scientists faulted FERC’s Grid Resiliency 
NOPR for its failure to consider alternatives like inverters that may foster
grid reliability. NERC-defined “essential reliability services” include, “a 
number of unpaid capabilities that can be provided by inverter-based generation
(solar, wind and storage).”168 Embedding communications capability
throughout the energy network enhances deployment and reliability. 
163. Id. at 16, fig. 14, Solar and Wind Production on Feb. 6, 2017. 
164. Id. at 18. 
165. CPUC D.16-06-052, Alternate Decision Instituting Cost Certainty, Granting
Joint Motions To Approve Proposed Revisions To Electric Tariff Rule 21, And Providing 
Smart Inverter Development A Pathway Forward For Pacific Gas And Electric Company,
Southern California Edison Company, and San Diego Gas & Electric Company, June 23, 
2016, http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publisheddocs/published/g000/m164/k376/164376491.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MS8Z-5ZVM].
166. Id. at Finding of Fact 21, Attach. D, Filing Schedule. 
167. CPUC, Smart Inverter Working Group, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?
id=4154 [https://perma.cc/HWF3-QBTA] (adopting a Sept. 8, 2017 requirement for Phase
I Smart Inverter autonomous functions, and a March 1, 2018 date or nine months after release
of specified protocol certifications for Phase 2 Communications Protocols.  Discussions
about Phase 3 protocols continue within the Smart Inverter Working Group.)
168. Union of Concerned Scientists, Comments, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 
RM18–1–000, at 3, Oct. 23, 2017. 
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D. Aliso Canyon Natural Gas Storage Field Leak; Mobilizing 

Internet-enabled Resources Through California’s 

Low-income Energy Savings Assistance Program 

to Reduce Energy Demand and Balance 

Supply Constraints, 2015 to 2020
 
Strategies to reduce electricity and natural gas demand helped prevent 
energy shortages in the Los Angeles area–home to twenty-six million 
people–after a methane leak at the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage field, the 
largest in the LA region.  A methane plume spewed into the atmosphere for
months starting in October 2015 while SoCalGas, the storage field operator, 
worked to stop the leak. 
In early 2016, the CPUC ordered SoCalGas to halt storage field use for 
natural gas supply after withdrawing some natural gas to reduce pressure
and slow the methane leak.169  The Aliso Canyon storage field was closed
from late October 2015 to mid-2017, and since the field reopened, the CPUC 
has limited natural gas injections and withdrawals.170 
In 2016, the CPUC adopted measures to increase energy efficiency and 
demand response. The CPUC worked to embed demand response, connect
with CBOs, solicit and approve contracts with DERs, and upgrade transmission
resources to, “better withstand Aliso Canyon[‘s outage] when the number
one source of natural gas was no longer available.”171 
To reduce energy demand the CPUC deployed its Energy Savings 
Assistance Program (ESAP or ESA) which strives to reduce energy burdens
for low-income customers of Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs).  Section
2790 of the California Public Utilities Code directs the CPUC to, “require 
an electrical or gas corporation to perform home weatherization services
for low-income customers . . . taking into consideration both the cost­
169. CPUC, ALISO CANYON WELL FAILURE, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/aliso/ [http:// 
perma.cc/HJM4-BU8S] (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
170. CPUC, CEC, STATE INSPECTIONS CONFIRM SAFETY OF ALISO CANYON NATURAL
GAS STORAGE FACILITY, FACILITY CLEARED TO RESUME LIMITED ACTIVITY TO PREVENT
ENERGY SHORTAGES, July 19, 2017, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public
_Website/Content/News_Room/News_and_Updates/ReleaseStateInspectionsConfirmSaf
etyofAlisoCanyon.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG2L-Q8UQ]; Olga Grigoryants, SoCal Gas will 
ramp up gas injections at Aliso Canyon, L.A. DAILY NEWS, May 16, 2018, https://www. 
dailynews.com/2018/05/16/socal-gas-will-ramp-up-gas-injections-at-aliso-canyon/ [https:// 
perma.cc/KWX2-K72K].
171. Robert Mullin, Sandoval: Nuke Shutdown, Auto-DR Aided Aliso Canyon Response, 
RTO INSIDER, Nov. 21, 2016, https://www.rtoinsider.com/sandoval-auto-dr-aliso-canyon­
34586/ [https://perma.cc/65PR-S72R].
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effectiveness of the services and the policy of reducing the hardships
facing low-income households.”172 
ESA supports weatherization measure installation including “building 
conservation measures, energy management technology, energy-efficient 
appliances, and energy education programs determined by the commission to
be feasible.”173 AB 793 defined “energy management technology” to “include
a product, service, or software that allows a customer to better understand
and manage electricity or gas use in the customer’s home.”174  This statutory
definition of energy management technology includes connected thermostats,
Internet access to energy consumption data transmitted to customers through 
the Open Internet from their Smart Meter data, and a range of other technologies.
ESAP complements California’s energy bill assistance for low-income
households provided through California Alternative Rates for Energy (CARE).
CARE provides up to a 33 percent discount on electricity and natural gas 
bills for IOU energy customers.175  More than 4.49 million low-income 
California households received CARE bill assistance in 2014.176  Between 
2002 and 2016, over 3.5 million low-income California households received
ESA weatherization treatments.177  ESA participation is anticipated to increase 
following the CPUC’s November 2016 Decision, which adjusted CPUC rules
to increase household and system energy benefits, and reduce GHG emissions.178
 172. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2790 (Added by Stats. 1989, c. 462, § 2. Amended by
Stats.1999, c. 700 (A.B.1393), § 3; Stats.2001-2002, 2nd Ex.Sess., c. 11 (S.B.2), § 5, eff.
Aug. 8, 2002; Stats.2015, c. 589 (A.B.793), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2016.)
173. A.B. § 793 (Quirk), ch. 589 (amending CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2790, and adding §
717 (2015) to the Public Utilities Code, relating to public utilities), https://leginfo.legislature. 
ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB793 [https://perma.cc/4AMC-ST9M].
174. Id.
175. CPUC, CARE/FERA PROGRAMS, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=976 
[https://perma.cc/8PFF-VXDG] (“Low-income customers that are enrolled in the CARE 
program receive a 30-35 percent discount on their electric bill and a 20 percent discount 
on their natural gas bill.”)
176. CPUC, ENERGY DIVISION, SUMMARY OF ENERGY LOW-INCOME PROGRAMS FOR 




178. CPUC D.16-11-022, DECISION ON LARGE INVESTOR-OWNEDUTILITIES’CALIFORNIA
ALTERNATE RATES FOR ENERGY (CARE) AND ENERGY SAVINGS ASSISTANCE (ESA) PROGRAM 
APPLICATIONS (Application 14-11-009), at 13, Nov. 10, 2016 (adopting Alternate Proposed
Decision of Commissioner Catherine J.K. Sandoval) [hereinafter CPUC, CARE/ESA Decision 
2016].  Special thanks to staff of my Office while I served as a CPUC Commissioner, particularly
Michael Colvin, Jamie Ormond, Ditas Katague, Bill Johnston, Amy Baker, Lolita Hajian, 
and Anna-Marie Madrigal, the CPUC Energy Division, the ALJ Division, and the Policy
and Planning Division, and to the CPUC Commissioners and staff for contributions to this 
decision’s drafting and development. Special thanks to the parties who developed and contributed
to the decision record. Thanks to the CPUC Low-Income Oversight Board (LIOB) members,
including LIOB Chair Robert Castenada and former Chair Jose Hernandez, the CPUC staff 
36
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In April, 2016, an Interim Decision in the CPUC ESA proceeding directed
SCE and SoCalGas to accelerate the deployment of energy savings and 
demand response measures through ESA.179 
In the summer of 2016, while Aliso Canyon remained closed, CAISO 
declared Flex Alerts on June 20, July 27, and July 28 in response to “reliability
concerns related to high temperatures and high demand.”180  During these 
Flex Alert days, SCE obtained over 300 MWs of demand response reduction 
through the Air Conditioner (AC) cycling program, an amount equivalent 
to the power generated by a peaker plant.181 
To obtain the equivalent amount of energy from a gas-fired power plant,
it can take years to site, gain regulatory approval for, and build a gas-fired
power plant, and require substantial investment.  In 2015 the CPUC approved 
a power purchase agreement for SDG&E to charge ratepayers $2.6 billion 
to build a 500 MW gas-fired peaker plant.182 Regulatory approval for new
gas-fired power plants is uncertain as indicated by the 2017 recommendation
of two members of the California Energy Commission to reject NRG’s
proposal to build a power plant in Oxnard, California.183 
who support LIOB, and those who attend LIOB meetings for their dedication to improving
the lives of Californians; See also CPUC D.17-12-009, Decision Resolving Petitions for
Modification of D.16-16-11-022 (Dec. 14, 2017) (granting in part and denying in part petitions
for modification, and update the budget) [hereinafter CPUC, CARE/ESA Modification Decision, 
2017].
179. CPUC D.16-04-040, DECISION ADOPTING MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THE ALISO 
CANYON NATURAL GAS LEAK EMERGENCY, Apr. 21, 2016, http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/Published
Docs/Published/G000/M160/K091/160091266.PDF [https://perma.cc/FSX4-B2YY].
180. Id. at 31; CAISO, California ISO Declares Flex Alert for Southern California, 
FLEXALERT.ORG, June 19, 2016, http://www.caiso.com/Documents/CaliforniaISODeclares
FlexAlertforSouthernCaliforniaforMonday_6-20-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAP3-98DC];
CAISO, California ISO extends Flex Alert through Thursday, FLEXALERT.org, July 27,
2016, http://www.caiso.com/Documents/CaliforniaISOExtendsStatewideFlexAlertThrough
Thursday.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2KY-CLAU].
181. Mullin, supra note 171. 
182. Eric Wesoff, California PUC Approves 500MW of Gas for SD&GE, Rejects
Alternative, GTM, May 22, 2015, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/california- 
puc-approves-500mw-of-gas-for-sdge-in-carlsbad-rejects-alterna#gs.Hoce5w8 [https://
perma.cc/2JMT-GJVQ].
183. Darrell Proctor, NRG Stops Plans for California Gas Plant, POWER, Oct. 17, 
2017, www.powermag.com/nrg-stops-plans-for-california-gas-plant [https://perma.cc/8FR4­
XFHB]; STATUS OF ALL PROJECTS, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
sitingcases/all_projects.html [https://perma.cc/W9S9-96DP] (listing approved power plant siting
decisions, projects not approved, withdrawn projects, and projects under review.  Disapproved 
projects include the Sun Valley Energy Project, whose application for siting approval was
filed Dec. 1, 2005, and rejected by the CEC Oct. 19, 2015). 
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In contrast, demand response requires no siting or environmental review, 
emits no GHGs or carbon, uses neither fuel nor water, and is enabled by 
the Internet for program enrollment and demand response signals. While
Los Angeles faced a natural gas shortage, demand response shaved electricity 
and natural gas demand using Internet-enabled demand response. “This 
isn’t your father’s DR,” I reported to NARUC in November 2016, “this is
auto-DR.”184 
In November 2016 the CPUC adopted the Alternate Proposed Decision 
that I authored, D.16-11-022, to invest an annual budget of $1.3 billion in 
2016-2020 for both CARE and ESAP.185 The CPUC approved ESAP budget 
for 2017-2020 totaled over $2.310 billion, including investments in Internet-
enabled demand response services, energy education, customer enrollment, 
and energy management facilitated by the Internet.186 
The CPUC sought to extend the energy benefits associated with ratepayer
spending on weatherization measures by using technology designed to 
enable customer and grid benefits. The CARE/ESAP Decision observed: 
It is not enough to simply install a new thermostat, but a smart thermostat that is
capable of recognizing behavior and adjusting temperatures accordingly.  While
installing an efficient Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning system in a common 
area of a multi-family building is good, a system that can respond to system
constraints during a Flex Alert is even better.187 
The CARE/ESAP Decision approved ratepayer investments in several 
Internet-based services including, “a smart thermostat that can participate 
in a demand response program, or a lighting control that can be internet 
enabled to track entry/exit behavior.”188 
The CPUC invested ESAP funds in Internet-enabled demand response, 
customer and third-party facing Internet access to energy data to reduce
energy demand “during peak energy use periods and in times of system
constraints, such as Flex Alert days.”189  The CPUC determined that in “the
areas affected by the Aliso Canyon State of Emergency reducing low-income
customer gas usage . . . help[s] all customers avoid blackouts and other threats
to safety and reliability.”190 The FCC’s 2015 Decision to prevent ISPs from
engaging in blocking, throttling, or paid prioritization through enforceable
 184. Mullin, supra note 171. 
185. CPUC, CARE/ESA Decision 2016, supra note 178; see also CPUC D.17-12-009, 
supra note 178. 
186. CPUC, CARE/ESA Decision 2016, supra note 178, at 38; Sandoval, Internet Freedom




CPUC, CARE/ESA Decision 2016, supra note 178, at 7.
Id. at 53. 
189. Id. at 54. 
190. Id. at 106. 
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rules and jurisdiction gave my CPUC colleagues and me the confidence
to authorize billions in energy and water ratepayer investments directed
to harness the Internet to save energy and water.191 
To help meet energy system needs and reduce energy hardships for
ESA-eligible customers, the CPUC required large IOUs to educate ESA-
eligible customers about demand response or tariffs that might reduce 
energy bills.192 The CPUC concluded that, “[l]everaging the investments 
in the ESA program to facilitate participation in demand response programs
will extend the energy related benefits of this program.”193 
The CARE/ESA Decision facilitates low-income household enrollment
in demand response programs, a grid-balancing and environmental asset.
Demand response, verifiable by meter and consumption data, can reduce 
the need to invest in additional generation capacity. Demand response enhances 
grid flexibility and adaptability, reduces localized energy demand to increase
reliability, improve safety, and reduce energy system costs. 
Through the CPUC’s CARE/ESA Decision, the Smart Grid extends to 
the smart phone.  D.16-11-022 orders energy utilities and contractors to
enroll customers who have an active email address and home or mobile 
Internet access in energy education programs, and to facilitate the ability 
of customers to use mobile or stationery computers to enroll in ESAP.194 
D.16-11-022 also ordered upgrades to the My Energy/My Account program 
to enable mobile and computer notification about high energy usage to help
avoid high bills, lower energy consumption, and provide grid-level benefits.195
 191. 
192. 
Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 51.
Id. at 54. 
193. Id.
 194. Id. at 171, 318; CPUC, CARE/ESA Modification Decision 2016, supra note 178, 
at 8 (directing IOUs to develop by Dec. 31, 2017 mobile versions of their Internet websites, 
including MyEnergy/MyAccount, to allow for ESA and CARE program enrollment, post 
enrollment verification, and program recertification on mobile phones.”). 
195. CPUC, CARE/ESA Decision 2016, supra note 178, at 318–19. 
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VII. RISKS OF ISP GATEKEEPING BEHAVIOR TO THE ENERGY 





A. Repeal Without Replace: The 2018 Internet Freedom Order  

Leaves Critical Infrastructure and Internet Users  

Without Protection for a Range of Harms 

The FCC’s January 2018 Internet Freedom Order repealed FCC rules 
adopted in 2015 that prohibited ISPs from blocking, throttling, or paid
prioritization of Internet traffic with some limited exceptions for  reasonable 
network management.196 The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order repealed the
Title II classification of ISPs as common carriers subject to non-discrimination 
obligations under the Communications Act of 1934 adopted in the FCC’s 
2015 Open Internet Order.197 Title II categorization provided the legal 
grounding for the 2015 Order’s prohibitions of blocking, throttling, and paid 
priority.198 
Instead, the FCC’s 2018 Order classified ISPs as information service
providers, a category that allows the FCC to impose disclosure obligations 
on ISPs and limits FCC enforcement authority to breaches of ISP disclosure
rules.199  The D.C. Circuit held in 2014 in Verizon v. FCC that the information 
service provider categorization offers no legal authority for non-discrimination, 
net neutrality rules.200 
The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order drops the 2015 Open Internet Order’s
proscription of throttling, blocking, or paid-prioritization except for reasonable
network management that must be “primarily motivated by a technical network
management justification rather than other business justifications.”201 The
Internet Freedom Order requires disclosure of blocking and throttling practices
except for “reasonable network management” which it redefines as a practice
“appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management
purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and technology
 196. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 2–4; cf. FCC, 2015 Open Internet 
Order, supra note 5, at ¶¶  14, 21, 32. 
197. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 2. 
198. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at ¶¶  2, 326, 336 (“concluding 
that broadband Internet access service is a telecommunications service”); cf. Verizon v. 
FCC, 740 F.3d at 655–56 (overturning FCC net neutrality rules as imposing common carrier 
obligations despite classifying ISPs as information service providers and not common carriers 
under Title II). 
199. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 2. 
200. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d at 655–56 (overturning FCC net neutrality rules as 
imposing common carrier obligations despite classifying ISPs as information service
providers and not common carriers under Title II). 
201. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 215–216. 
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of the broadband Internet access service.”202 This new definition allows
ISPs to manage Internet traffic in their business interest.
The Internet Freedom Order provides the first express FCC authorization 
for ISPs to engage in paid prioritization by lifting enforceable proscriptions
of the practice.203  This Order gives ISPs legal permission to charge for
Internet priority, content distribution or access, even when doing so harms
other Internet users or uses. The FCC reached this conclusion without 
examining paid priority’s consequences for other Internet users including 
critical infrastructure, violating the APA for failure to consider relevant 
factors and important issues.204 
Under the FCC’s Order, an ISP must disclose that it offers paid priority. 
Tracking the words of the FCC’s required disclosure, an ISP’s terms of
service could state that it engages in a “practice that directly or indirectly 
favors some traffic over other traffic, including through use of techniques 
such as traffic shaping, prioritization, or resource reservation, in exchange 
for consideration, monetary or otherwise.”205  The FCC’s 2018 Order does not
require ISPs to disclose the parties to or terms of paid priority transactions, 
the execution of such deals, or their consequences.  Neither does the FCC’s
Order require ISPs to get their subscriber’s consent to paid priority deals.
Disclosure that an ISP engages in paid priority or traffic shaping does not
inform consumers, content providers, or regulators of priority deals, or when
and how the ISP will launch priority or degrade other service.
The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order dismisses as “small” any unaddressed 
harms from paid priority. “To the extent that our approach relying on
transparency requirements, consumer protection laws, and antitrust laws 
does not address all concerns, we find that any remaining unaddressed
harms are small relative to the costs of implementing more heavy-handed 
regulation,”206 the FCC’s order concludes.  The FCC stated no reasons to 
202. Id. at ¶ 216. 
203. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 2–4. 
204. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (“agency action is lawful only
if it rests “on a consideration of the relevant factors.”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“(“[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary
and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”). 
205. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 216. 
206. Id. at ¶ 116. 
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justify its conclusion that likely harms of paid priority are small; this lack 
of reasoned decision-making and explanation violates the APA.207 
The Order does not discuss or analyze in any detail harms that may arise 
from its decision which are not compensable in antitrust law, by the FTC 
Act, or consumer protection laws such as harms to democracy, national 
security, critical infrastructure sectors, and the environment. The FCC’s
Order failed to deliberate the impact of net neutrality repeal on critical
infrastructure including energy, sectors for which cybersecurity vigilance 
is mandatory.208  A court may uphold agency action “only on the grounds
that the agency invoked when it took the action.”209  The FCC’s failure to 
examine these concerns in the Internet Freedom Order or to explain its 
reasoning violates the APA, and raises risks for critical infrastructure as 
discussed below.210 
B. Paid Priority Without Condition Increases Risks to Critical 

Infrastructure and Other Internet Users 

The FCC’s 2018 Internet Freedom Order imposes no conditions on paid
priority offerings.  In contrast, many scholars who have examined whether 
the FCC and Congress should permit paid priority or “Quality of Service” 
(QoS) Internet offerings recommended it only if other Internet users or
applications are protected from degraded service.
Barbara van Schweick proposed to allow user-controlled QoS guarantees, 
a form of paid priority if:
(1) the different classes of service are available equally to all applications and
classes of applications; (2) the user is able to choose whether, when, and for
which application to use which class of service;476 and (3) the network provider
is allowed to charge only its own Internet service customers for the use of the
different classes of service.211 
Professor van Schweick envisions user-determined priority, consistent with 
the principle of “innovation without permission.”212 Michael Katz argues that
a “menu of usage-sensitive pricing options that allow end users to choose the 
207. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2710 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,
87 (1943)).
208.  42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). 
209. Id.
210. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (“Federal administrative agencies are required
to engage in “reasoned decisionmaking.”) (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)”); id. at 2706, 2712 (holding that EPA unreasonably
interpreted § 7412(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act when it deemed cost irrelevant to the 
decision to regulate power plants)). 
211. Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What A
Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 133 (2015). 
212. Id. at 136. 
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quality of their connections on an edge-provider-specific basis” would 
foster “consumer choice [that] neutralizes the net neutrality regulations.”213 
Katz argues against a flat ban on paid priority but acknowledges that the 
effects of paid prioritization are fact specific.214 
Phil Weiser recommended “a reasonable level of best efforts access”
for other users and applications concurrent with any QoS or priority offering.215 
In 2015 the FCC rejected proposals to allow individualized negotiations 
for fast Internet access with minimum speed guarantees for other users and 
applications, citing my comments filed when I served as a CPUC Commissioner. 
“[A]ny of the minimum level of access standards the FCC proposes would 
be insufficient to support the needs of a diversity of Internet users including
Critical Infrastructure.”216 
Daniel Lyons argues that ISP regulations grounded in the common carrier 
non-discrimination rules of Section 202 of the Communications Act, “would
permit a broadband provider to offer a tiered-service model, as long as 
premium tier service was generally available to all interested content and 
application providers at similar rates.”217  Similarly, Christopher Yoo argued 
that, “Title II reclassification would not necessarily prevent broadband 
access providers from offering premium services at premium prices.”218 
Adam Candeub and Daniel McCartney contend that “to defend an open
Internet does not require (to borrow the phrase from employment law)
“equal, non-discriminatory treatment” of bits or traffic . . . but ‘equality of
outcomes,’ i.e., equality of Internet experience, for user applications.”219 
Rob Frieden argues the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order, “could have prevented
possibly harmful regulatory uncertainty by establishing a simple and clear 
213. Michael L. Katz, Wither U.S. Net Neutrality Regulation?, 50 REV. OF INDUS. ORG.
441, 461 (2017), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11151-017-9573-0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35JM-CWSJ].
214. Id. at 30. 
215. Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273,
320 (2008).
216. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at ¶ 114, n.254 (citing Letter from
Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Commissioner, California Public Utilities Commission, to Marlene 
H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 14-28, 10-127, Attach. at 14 (filed Oct. 14, 2014)) 
[hereinafter Commissioner Sandoval, Ex Parte Letter].
217. Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommunications, 
54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1029, 1059 (2012). 
218. Christopher S. Yoo, Wickard for the Internet? Network Neutrality After Verizon
v. FCC, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 415, 444 (2014). 
219.  Adam Candeub & Daniel McCartney, Law and the Open Internet, 64 FED. COMM.
L.J. 493, 497–98 (2012). 
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rule that ISPs can offer [QOS] enhancements that help expedite the delivery
of [Internet Protocol Television] IPTV without degrading their conventional,
best efforts traffic routing.”220  James B. Speta argued after Verizon v. 
FCC that if the FCC did not classify ISPs as common carriers under Title 
II, the FCC should focus on competitive effects of ISP conduct and, “forbid 
Internet carrier actions that foreclosed competition.”221 
In contrast to the suggestion of several scholars as discussed above, the 
FCC’s Internet Freedom Order does not restrict Internet priority to that
generated by user control.  The FCC’s Order places no limits on ISP payment 
demands from edge providers, nor does it restrain paid priority practices.
Neither does the Order require ISPs to make paid priority available to all 
customers on equal terms.  Nor does it require ISPs to shield other Internet
users from service degradation due to paid priority.  
Such restraints would arguably impose common carrier duties on ISPs not 
to discriminate among Internet traffic, and thus would require the Title II
classification imposed in the 2015 Open Internet Order.222  Instead, the
FCC repealed the Title II classification, and with it, the authority to constrain
ISP paid priority and to protect Internet users from degraded service. 
The FCC downplayed the scope and magnitude of anticipated delays
from the paid priority its decision authorizes.  The FCC grounded its rationale
for rejecting concerns about paid priority on AT&T’s assertion that, “[l]ast- 
mile access is not a zero-sum game, and prioritizing the packets for latency- 
sensitive applications will not typically degrade other applications sharing
the same infrastructure,” examples of which the FCC listed such as email,
software updates, or cached video.223  The FCC concludes that “[b]ecause
of these practical limits on paid prioritization, we reject the argument that
non-profits and independent and diverse content producers, who may be
less likely to need QoS guarantees, will be harmed by lifting the ban.”224 
The FCC’s conclusion does not analyze the qualifiers in AT&T’s explanation
that prioritizing latency-sensitive application packets will not typically
degrade other applications sharing the same infrastructure.  AT&T’s statement
recognizes degradation is possible but projects that it would not be typical
for other applications, while the FCC only conjectured its effect on “email,
software updates, or cached video.” The FCC failed to analyze paid priority’s
 220. Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality and Consumer Demand for “Better Than Best 
Efforts” Traffic Management, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 71, 102 (2015). 
221. James B. Speta, Unintentional Antitrust: The FCC’s Only (and Better) Way Forward 
with Net Neutrality after the Mess of Verizon v. F.C.C., 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 491, 501–02 
(2014).
222.  Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d at 655–56. 
223. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 258 (citing AT&T Comments 
at 44–45). 
224. Id. at ¶ 254. 
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affect on applications such as “specialized software and Google Sheets”
used by the Santa Clara County, California fire department’s Office of
Emergency Service incident support unit during fires such as California’s 
2018 Mendocino Complex Fire “to do near-real-time resource tracking
through the use of cloud computing over the Internet.”225 The FCC’s list 
omits analysis of paid priority’s impact on streaming video or audio, large 
file transfers, mapping, and other common applications. 
Notably, utility work crews commonly use mapping applications for service 
calls, maintenance, and emergency response, as do millions of Americans. 
Live stream video is becoming increasingly important to monitoring energy
system conditions, physical and cyber security, and daily operations.  The
California Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) review of Sonoma
County’s response during the 2017 Wine Country fires notes that “the
availability of social media, 24-hour news services, and wireless devices have 
led citizens to assume that they will receive prompt and useful information
about current events including disasters.”226 
Furthermore, the FCC does not limit priority Internet access deals to
latency-sensitive applications.  The FCC speculates that, “in practice, paid 
prioritization is likely to be used to deliver enhanced service for applications 
that need QoS guarantees.”227 In fact, some content providers may seek priority 
access to ensure their messages are promptly transmitted.228  For example,
priority may be sought to be first in line for court filings, whether or not
such priority delays other filers or even court communications. Others
 225. Id.; cf. Addendum to Brief for Gov. Petitioners, Mozilla Corp. et. al. v. FCC,
USCA Case # 18-1051, Declaration of Fire Chief Anthony Bowden at ¶ 6 (declaring that
Santa Clara County Fire Department’s emergency services incident support unit “relied heavily
on the use of specialized software and Google Sheets to do near-real-time resource tracking 
through the use of cloud computing over the Internet.”); ¶ 6 (“In large and complex fires, 
resource allocation requires immediate information. Dated or stale information regarding 
the availability or need for resources can slow response times and render them far less
effective. Resources could be deployed to the wrong fire, the wrong part of a fire, or fail 
to be deployed at all. Even small delays in response translate into devastating effects, including 
loss of property, and, in some cases, loss of life.”). 
226. PUBLIC ALERT AND WARNING PROGRAM ASSESSMENT FOR SONOMA COUNTRY,
CALOES, Feb. 26, 2018, http://code.pressdemocrat.com/pdf/Sonoma%20Assessment%20 
with%20Cover%20Letter.022618[3].pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ6C-QR2J]. 
227. Id. at ¶¶ 216, 254. 
228. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at n.942 (citing but not analyzing
Engine Reply at 6–7 (“While ISPs are fond of noting that telemedicine and autonomous vehicle 
services are far more latency-sensitive than email traffic, these types of unique services are
likely to represent a tiny fraction of the prioritization deals ISPs will seek to cut if the existing
ban on paid prioritization is removed.”)).
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may want to buy Internet priority just before elections or at other important 
times.  ISPs could sell priority in economically or strategically-sensitive 
locations, like priority triggered by events or conditions such as stock
market or economic indicators.  People or entities may seek paid priority
deals to increase their economic, political, or competitive advantage.  An 
examination of the potential impact of paid priority on demand response,
and thus energy reliability, safety, costs, and the environment, highlights the 
risks of net neutrality’s repeal.
C. Video Game Priority Kills the Energy Star: The FCC Allows ISP 

Video Game Paid Priority Deals to Trump Energy  

Reliability, Safety, Just and Reasonable  

Rates, and the Environment 

In the FCC Internet Freedom Docket, several ISPs argued for the repeal
of the 2015 Open Internet Order’s rule prohibiting ISP paid priority deals. 
Comcast argued for “a more flexible approach to prioritization” than the 
2015 order’s ban, citing the example that, “a telepresence service tailored for 
the hearing impaired requires high-definition video that is of sufficiently 
reliable quality to permit users ‘to perceive subtle hand and finger motions’ 
in real time.”229 Comcast highlighted the potential benefits of paid priority
for autonomous vehicles but offered no safeguards for other Internet users.230 
Verizon stated, “[w]e support rules that prevent providers from charging
content suppliers a fee to deliver their Internet traffic faster than the Internet
traffic of others where the result is harm to competition or consumers.”231 
Any “prohibition on paid prioritization,” Verizon argued, “needs to be focused
on the instance where a provider might slow a consumer’s access to a particular
website or application in favor of another, competing one.”232  Verizon’s
comments address neither the non-competition harms of paid priority nor 
the definition of “consumer harm.” Instead, Verizon argued for user-controlled
paid priority that allows consumers, “to choose to prioritize certain content or
applications, where technologically practicable.”233 
229. Comments of Comcast Corporation, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 
WC Docket No. 17-208, at 56 July 17, 201), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/107171777114654/ 
2017-07-17%20AS-FILED%20Comcast%202017%20Open%20Internet%20Comments 
%20and%20Appendices.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY2Z-UM64]. 
230. Jacob Kastrenakes, Comcast says it should be able to create internet fast lanes 
for self-driving cars, THE VERGE, July 17, 2017, https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/17/ 
15985114/comcast-paid-prioritization-autonomous-cars [https://perma.cc/5RW3-D68C].
231. Comments of Verizon, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 17-108, at 
4, July 17, 2017, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10717390819816/2017%2007%2017%20Verizon
%20comments%202017%20Open%20Internet%20Notice.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DZ9-HLFB].
232. Id. at 20. 
233. Id. 
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AT&T argued that eliminating the bar on paid priority would allow it 
to, “begin implementing isolated paid-prioritization arrangements to support 
[QoS] for unusually latency-sensitive applications, such as high-definition
videoconferencing or massively multiplayer online gaming (MMOG).”234 
AT&T presupposes but does not define an “isolated paid-prioritization 
arrangement.” 
AT&T’s example of a paid priority deal with an online gaming provider 
illustrates the predicaments such deals pose for content providers and
subscribers who are not parties to that deal.  An ISP’s priority deal with a 
video game provider–whether foreign or domestic–could impact a range 
of communications to and from the subscriber’s account. The ISP’s priority
transmission of the video game may delay the grid operator’s or utility’s
signal to a demand response aggregator, and the energy resource’s reply. 
It may delay a demand response communication with an Internet-connected
thermostat or a DER, or a DER’s response to a request to provide voltage
support.  Such conduct undermines electric reliability for the sake of the 
ISP’s profit and the video game’s benefit. 
Paid priority delays may raise energy costs and decrease grid, demand
response, and Internet-enabled energy resource reliability.  FERC Order 
745 requires that a, “demand response bidder must have ‘the capability to
provide the service’ offered; it must . . . actually be able to reduce electricity 
use and thereby obviate the operator’s need to secure additional power.”235 
Second, the price paid for a demand response bid “must be cost-effective,” 
as measured by “the net benefits test” of whether it will save money for 
wholesale purchasers.236 
Order 745 raises risks of non-compliance with both conditions for demand
response bidding: capability to provide the service and cost-effectiveness. 
Demand response is sensitive to delayed communication and is ineffective 
if power reduction is not quickly deployed when called.  To comply with 
NERC reliability rules, CAISO requires “fast-acting” demand response to 
234. Comments of AT&T Services Inc., In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 
17-108, at 5 (July 17, 2017), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10717906301564/AT%26T%20 
Internet%20Freedom%20Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT5S-RB5Y].
235. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. at 763.
236. CPUC, 2017 Filing Guide for System, Local and Flexible Resource Adequacy
(RA) Compliance Filings 7–8, Sept. 20, 2016, www.cpuc.ca.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset. 
aspx?id=6442450957 [https://perma.cc/JPA2-PZCT] (explaining that fast response DR 
[demand response] and gas-fired resources must be able to respond within 20 minutes including
notification time so CAISO has 10 minutes to make any adjustments to maintain supply
and demand balance and avoid problems including blackouts). 
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provide energy reduction within twenty minutes.237 In dismissing concerns
about the consequences of paid priority, the FCC relied on AT&T’s statement
that paid priority would not “typically” slow uses such as email, software
updates, and cached video.238 This projection fails to assess the range of paid 
priority consequences, including its effects on energy resource dispatch,
costs, safety, reliability, the environment, and competition. 
As discussed infra VII(6), the FCC’s Order allows ISPs to ask energy
resources, the grid operator, and utilities to pay the ISP for priority treatment 
for timely Internet transmission, or face delays.  The ability to deliver demand
reduction is already incorporated into energy wholesale market bids. If those 
bids must take into account ISP charges for fast Internet access or protection 
from delay, energy prices may rise, a factor the FCC’s Internet Freedom
Order did not consider. 
ISP priority for video games at the expense of other Internet signals could
cause harms that multiply as hundreds, thousands, or millions play a video 
game.  Other content providers and even the subscriber may be powerless
to interrupt the ISP’s priority deal.  The FCC leaves it up to the ISP to determine 
how to execute priority treatment.  The ISP may launch priority when the
user plays the video game, effectively erecting barriers that delay other Internet 
traffic. If advertisers could buy priority, a user’s search on a web page 
may launch priority for an ad streaming audio and video in the sidebar, 
even if the user doesn’t play the video game. 
Congressional Hearings conducted in October 2017, during the pendency
of the Internet Freedom Proceeding, examined more than 3,000 ads Russian 
operatives bought on Facebook during the 2016 election.239 This Article
warns that paid priority could be used to accelerate ads or other communications,
while slowing access to other messages.  Paid priority that degrades other
Internet users can harm national security, democracy, the economy, public 
safety, energy reliability, and the environment. 
ISP priority deals may reduce the ability to reliably harness energy
resources. State PUCs would have to consider measures to restore energy 
system reliability including authorizing construction of new power resources 
at additional cost to energy ratepayers and the environment.  Such ISP conduct 
would put electric reliability, public safety, and the environment at risk– 
all harms not compensable by Antitrust, Unfair Competition, and consumer 
protection law. 
237. Id. 
238. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 258 (citing AT&T Comments 
at 44–45). 
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D. ISP Participation in the Home Energy Management Market and 

Limits of FERC Market Manipulation Rules to Address 

Harms of Paid Priority Delays 

Some ISPs also offer home energy management services and bid into 
ISO markets through a demand response aggregator.  Comcast expanded 
into the home automation market through, “cameras and thermostats that 
can be controlled remotely–for consumers who reside in apartments and 
condominiums.”240 Comcast ranked fourth in smart home market share in
2017, while CenturyLink and Time Warner Cable (now owned by Charter) 
also placed in the top ten smart home providers.241 
AT&T ranks third, “among U.S. smart home service providers, behind
two companies with roots in the home security business–Vivint and ADT.”242 
APX Holdings–which operates under the brand name Vivint–disclosed in
its December 2016 10-K SEC report the operational risk of ISP gatekeeping 
behavior.243  “Interference with our services or higher charges to customers 
by broadband service providers for using our products and services could 
cause us to lose existing subscribers, impair our ability to attract new 
subscribers and materially and adversely affect our business, financial 
condition, results of operations and cash flows,”244 APX cautioned. In
March 2018 following the FCC’s January 2018 Order repealing net neutrality
rules, APX’s 10-K advised investors that, “[w]hile it is difficult to predict 
what would occur in the absence of such rules, it is possible that as a result
of the lack of network neutrality rules, we could incur greater operating
expenses which could harm our results of operations.”245
 240. Anjali Athavaley, Comcast builds out ‘smart home’ strategy as cable shrinks, 
REUTERS, Aug. 28, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-comcast-security/comcast­
builds-out-smart-home-strategy-as-cable-shrinks-idUSKCN1B90EV [https://perma.cc/
ZL9G-YRCJ].
241. Joan Engebretson, Report: AT&T Third in Smart Home Market Share, 
TELECOMPETITOR, Jan. 24, 2017, http://www.telecompetitor.com/report-att-third-in-smart­
home-market-share/ [https://perma.cc/KUD2-GTQR].
242. Id.
243. APX Group Holdings Inc., 10-K, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Dec. 31, 2016, at 16–17, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1584423/0001584423
17000002/apx12311610kdocument.htm#sFF5765B8F651ABB0F4D488DC0ECC9D8D 
[https://perma.cc/92DK-RUCC] [hereinafter APX Dec. 2016 10-K].
244. Id.
245. APX Group Holdings Inc., 10-K, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Mar. 7, 2018, at 20, file:///I:/WORKSTUDY/Journals/JCEL/JCEL%20V.9%20Book%20
2017-18/Sandoval%20WF/e7941876-eef0-40aa-ba0c-49282def37f2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZY9M-GR59]  [hereinafter APX March 2018 10-K].
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Comcast offers customers in select markets a bundle combining, “Sunrun’s 
rooftop solar arrays and Brightbox battery system with Comcast’s Xfinity
Home security and energy efficiency management platform.”246 Comcast 
plans to use its base of 27 million customers and Comcast’s “vast communications
network to promote the offering.”247 AT&T plans to work with SunPower
to wirelessly connect 100,000 SunPower solar arrays with SunPower’s
data systems within the next two years.248 
An ISP’s broadband business arguably competes in a separate product 
market than its home energy services, though both use the same Internet 
platform.  In 2015, the FCC recognized that, “[b]roadband providers’ networks 
serve as platforms for Internet ecosystem participants to communicate,
enabling broadband providers to impose barriers to end-user access to the 
Internet on one hand, and to edge provider access to broadband subscribers
on the other.”249 The 2018 Internet Freedom Order allows an ISP to use
its broadband platform to charge for content that competes with its home
energy management business, subject to antitrust and unfair competition 
laws. ISP priority deals with video game providers and others may also 
affect the home energy management market and other markets due to paid
priority delays. 
Broadband services and ISP home energy management services arguably 
compete in separate, vertical markets, similar to the competitive posture 
of video service sold separately from Internet capacity.  The ISP’s home energy
management business competes in a horizontal product market for wholesale 
energy resources or for utility contracts with demand response aggregators,
independent thermostats, or DER operators. 
To pursue a monopoly leveraging theory that ISP conduct, in its broadband 
business, constitutes an unlawful attempt to monopolize the energy resources 
market, an antitrust plaintiff must show the defendant: “(1) possessed monopoly 
power in one market; (2) used that power to create a dangerous probability
of monopolizing another market; and (3) caused injury by such anticompetitive 
conduct.”250  In 45.2 percent of U.S. markets, two ISPs offer high-speed 
broadband (defined by the FCC as 25 mbps down and 3 mbps up), reflecting 




 248. Chris Meehan, AT&T, SunPower Partner to Market Home Solar, SOLAR REVIEWS, 
Apr. 26, 2016, https://www.solarreviews.com/news/att-sunpower-partner-home-solar­
marketing-042616/ [https://perma.cc/DN95-5AGY].
249. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at ¶ 80. 
250. A.I.B. Express, Inc. v. FedEx Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 239, 246–47 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (citing Verizon Comm’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 124 S. Ct. 872, 883 n.4 (2004)). 
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market share levels likely insufficient to demonstrate broadband market
monopoly power.251  Competitive bidding energy markets are designed to
encourage price competition for resources that can meet energy needs.
Demonstrating a dangerous probability of monopolizing the wholesale energy
market is a high bar.  Although monopoly leverage analysis is beyond this
Article’s scope, it appears that no antitrust law umbrella protects energy market
participants from ISP gatekeeping behavior. 
An ISP may entice customers to enter into bundle deals that include home
energy management, which the ISP will prioritize.  An ISP may offer paid 
priority to other energy market participants and have its home energy 
division pay its affiliated broadband division for priority at the same price,
or even at a lower price, than it would charge third parties.  AT&T’s “zero­
rating” exempts content providers who pay for sponsored data from Internet
plan data caps.252 The right pocket pays the left pocket, when an ISP’s
affiliated content company pays its sister broadband provider for priority, 
or is not required to pay at all.  For third parties, priority payments would
not be intracompany transfers, but payments to another company.
Priority payments may become a means to raise rivals’ costs,253 and thus
the costs of business for customers of those firms.  Ellen P. Goodman suggests 
that a regulator could reasonably conclude that zero-rating practices which, 
“produce the least benefits to users, with the greatest harm to edge providers 
. . . are likely too harmful and should be presumptively banned, depending 
251. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 125. 
252. See Letter from Jon Wilkins, Chief, Wireless Communications Bureau, FCC to
Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Senior Executive Vice President, External and Legislative Affairs,
at 2, Dec. 1, 2016, https://cdn3.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/7575775/Letter_to_R._ 
Quinn_12.1.16.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DJK-YB9H] (expressing concern about AT&T’s 
sponsored data program under which AT&T “incurs no comparable cost to offer its own
DIRECTV Now service on a zero-rated basis.”  AT&T seems to present the unaffiliated 
provider with a choice, “either pay a Sponsored Data rate (resulting in a $16-$47 per 
month - or higher - incremental cash cost not incurred by AT&T) that would make it very
difficult, if not infeasible, to offer a competitively-priced service, or instead require
its customers to pay significant amounts for their own usage of data while AT&T’s zero-
rated DIRECTV Now service offers customers the same usage for free.”).
253. See, e.g., Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986) (examining
as a potential antitrust violation the tendency of a vertical restraint to increase the production 
costs, and thereby the prices, of rival producers, and the ability of the firm increasing rivals’ 
costs to increase their own prices in those circumstances); cf. John J. Tharp, Raising Rivals’ 
Costs: Of Bottlenecks, Wine, and Bottled Soda, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 321, 324 (1989) (arguing 
that the theory of raising rivals’ cost as evidence of anticompetitive conduct ignores efficiency
considerations of exclusionary restraints).  
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on the state of broadband competition and the background state of user 
connectivity.”254 
The FCC under Chairman Tom Wheeler expressed concern about the 
competitive effects of AT&T’s zero-rating practice.255 FCC Chairman Ajit 
Pai ended that inquiry shortly after his appointment as Acting Chairman
when he stated that the FCC will not stymie consumer free data access.256 
ISP priority for its own energy management signals over those of
independent resources could be subject to a FERC market manipulation 
investigation under the FPA.257 CAISO monitors evidence of market
manipulation to “maintain an open and competitive market,” and provides 
that “no participant should be able to take unfair advantage of the rules or 
procedures or concentrate market power and inhibit competition.”258 If 
energy prices rise due to market manipulation, an application can be made 
to FERC for refund of the excess above just and reasonable rates.259 
A utility or energy market participant who enters a paid priority deal
with an ISP may risk allegations that such a deal makes them a party
to energy market manipulation. The FCC allows paid priority deals to slow 
or degrade other users’ signals.  Other energy market participants may use the
254. Ellen P. Goodman, Zero-Rating Broadband Data: Equality and Free Speech at
the Network’s Other Edge, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 63, 91 (2016). 
255. Letter from Jon Wilkins, supra note 252, at 1 (“Our concern is that AT&T’s
Sponsored Data program–i.e., the terms and conditions on which AT&T makes its
own network available to similarly situated unaffiliated providers denies unaffiliated third 
parties the same ability to compete over AT&T’s network on reasonable terms.”). 
256. Brian Fung, The FCC is dropping its probe into Internet providers over this
controversial practice, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2017/02/03/the-government-is-dropping-its-probe-into-a-controversial­
practice-by-your-internet-provider/?utm_term=.c5341726c918 [https://perma.cc/P7NM-7JJA].
257. See In re Enron Corp., 326 B.R. 257, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that 
FPA 16 U.S.C § 824(e) “provides FERC with broad remedial authority to address anti­
competitive behavior” supporting FERC’s authority to order disgorgement of money in excess 
of just and reasonable rates upon a finding of market manipulation during the California 
Energy crisis of 2000 to 2001). 
258. CAISO 2018-19, Market Monitoring, http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/Market
Monitoring/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7GHM-82GJ] (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
State of California, ex rel. Bill Lockyer, Attorney Gen. of the State of California, 125 FERC
¶¶ 61,016, 61,042 (Oct. 6, 2008) (“evidence from the 2000-2001 power crisis demonstrates that
numerous sellers engaged in repeated and pervasive acts of market manipulation,
collectively causing prices to be unjust and unreasonable, many of which manipulations 
involved the exercise of market power”); Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 462 F.3d at 
1043 (“FERC issued an order on July 25, 2001 in the Refund Proceedings establishing the 
framework for refunds of past sales in the spot markets operated by CalPX and Cal–ISO. 
259. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. et al., 96 FERC ¶ 61,120 (2001) (“July 25, 2001 
Order”). FERC ordered limited refunds for the rates it had determined to be unjust and 
unreasonable and established a mitigated market clearing price (“MMCP”) in an attempt
to replicate what it believed to be the just and reasonable rates that an unmanipulated 
competitive energy market would have produced.”). 
52




    










    
 





   
 
    
 
    
  
[VOL. 9:  1, 2017–18] Net Neutrality 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
same Internet platform to reach the same subscriber’s or IoT’s account. 
FERC, ISOs and state PUCs should review the potential for delay and energy
market manipulation from ISP paid priority deals. Rate refund beyond
those that are just and reasonable would not, however, provide a remedy 
for harms to safety, reliability, or environmental harm from having to call 
on more or build more GHG-emitting peaker plants. 
Not all ISPs participate in home energy services or participate in wholesale
energy markets, limiting the reach of FERC market manipulation rules to 
address such conduct. A full analysis of the applicability of FERC market 
manipulation rules is beyond this Article’s scope, but this example highlights
risks of ISP paid priority delays the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order failed
to consider. 
An ISP priority deal with a video game distributor that degrades independent 
thermostat or DER function and responsiveness may be difficult to detect
due to the limited disclosures the FCC requires. The California Energy
Crisis litigation was delayed by the difficulty of discovery of Enron’s and 
other market participants’ conduct. Tapes of Enron traders who laughed 
at traffic accidents during blackouts revealed the range of market manipulation
schemes and Enron’s intent to increase its profit at the expense of others.260 
There may be no tapes of ISP priority deals due to the limited disclosures 
the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order requires. The FCC does not mandate 
disclosure of parties to or terms of paid priority deals, their execution, or
consequences. Post facto discovery of ISP financial and operational records 
of such transactions and analysis of consequent Internet performance will 
be a daunting job for plaintiffs including regulators and utility operators. 
Neither do post facto rate refunds compensate for lost reliability, public 
safety, and environmental risks. 
E. ISP Incentives to Abuse Their Gatekeeper Position on the
 
Internet and the Terminating Access Monopoly
 
ISPs have long fought for authority to enter into paid priority arrangements 
to create a new revenue stream.  In 2013 Verizon’s lawyer lamented during
 260. Cf. Michael Flanagan, Evidence That Speaks Volumes: Best Practices for Collection,
Preservation and Review of Audio Recordings, ACC DOCKET, Sept. 1, 2013, at 34, 36, 
available at http://www.accdocket.com/articles/resource.cfm?show=1347139 [https://perma.cc/ 
KPX3-YWP3] (“One Nevada lawyer described the [Enron] recordings as not just a smoking
gun, but rather as an “audiotape of the gun being fired, the bullet hitting the victim, and the
murderer standing over the victim laughing.”). 
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oral argument in the Verizon v. FCC case that the FCC’s then-existing
prohibitions on Internet blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization were 
“foreclosing potential revenue streams.”261  The FCC’s Internet Freedom
Decision releases legal restraints on ISP financial incentives to collect
revenues from content providers. ISP shareholders may encourage them
to pursue these revenue opportunities. 
In 2014, the D.C. Circuit recognized in Verizon v. FCC that “[b]roadband 
providers also have powerful incentives to accept fees from edge providers,
either in return for excluding their competitors or for granting them prioritized
access to end users.”262 “In fact, there appears little dispute that broadband 
providers have the technological ability to distinguish between and discriminate
against certain types of Internet traffic,”263 the D.C. Circuit emphasized. 
The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order recognized “that broadband providers
have both the incentive and the ability to act as gatekeepers standing between
edge providers and consumers” and can undermine the “virtuous cycle” 
of innovation the Internet drives.264 
“Broadband providers can exploit this role by acting in ways that may
harm the open Internet, such as preferring their own or affiliated content, 
demanding fees from edge providers, or placing technical barriers to reaching
end users,”265 the 2015 Open Internet Order concluded. “As gatekeepers
. . . [ISPs] can block access altogether; they can target competitors, including 
competitors to their own video services; and they can extract unfair tolls.”266  In
2016 the D.C. Circuit in USTA v. FCC upheld the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet 
Order citing the FCC’s  analysis that “convincingly detailed how broadband
providers’ [gatekeeper] position in the market gives them the economic
power to restrict edge-provider traffic and charge for the services they furnish 
edge providers.”267 
261.  Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d at  649. 
262. Id. 645–46. 
263. Id. at 646. 
264. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at ¶ 7 (citing Verizon v. FCC, 
740 F.3d at 659; see Mark Wigfield, FCC Adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules To Protect The
Open Internet, NEWS FCC, Feb. 16, 2015, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ attachments/DOC­
332260A1.docx [https://perma.cc/LQ2Z-3QME] (“Internet openness drives a “virtuous
cycle” in which innovations at the edges of the network enhance consumer demand, leading to
expanded investments in broadband infrastructure that, in turn, spark new innovations at
the edge.”)).
265. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at ¶ 80. 
266. Id. at ¶ 20.
267. U.S. Telecom Ass’n. v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Verizon v.
FCC, 740 F.3d at 646 (upholding the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order transparency
rules and reversing the rules against blocking and throttling as common carrier-type
restrictions, not supported by the FCC’s classification of ISPs as information service 
providers)). 
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The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order concluded that ISP gatekeeper 
power gives the ISP bargaining power with edge or content providers.268 
“[R]egardless of the competition in the local market for broadband Internet
access, once a consumer chooses a broadband provider, that provider has 
a monopoly on access to the subscriber.”269 The D.C. Circuit recognized
that ISPs effectively have a “terminating access monopoly,”270 a concept 
rooted in antitrust law.  The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order recognized 
that “[o]nce the broadband provider is the sole provider of access to an end 
user, this can influence that network’s interactions with edge providers, end 
users, and others.”271 
Jonathan E. Nuechterlein and Christopher S. Yoo describe a “terminating 
access monopoly” in a communications network as one which “possesses 
monopoly power vis-à-vis third-party senders of communications traffic 
to its customers.”272 Neuchterlein and Yoo express concern about potential 
abuse of an ISP’s terminating access monopoly position in limited 
circumstances such as when “the interconnecting provider or its customer
has a particularized need to reach the customer set of the terminating access
provider,” though they anticipated market solutions might correct such
problems.273  As discussed below, IoT devices subject to energy demand 
response calls are examples of the class of customers about which Neuchterlein
and Yoo expressed concern, since they are usually “single-homed,” reachable 
through a single Internet connection, and need to respond within a short 
period of time. 
The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order dismisses the terminating access 
monopoly theory as applied to broadband, arguing that “end users do not
single home, but subscribe to more than one platform (e.g., one fixed and 
one mobile) capable of granting the end user effective access to the edge
provider’s content (i.e., they multi-home).”274  The Order concludes: “to the
extent multihoming occurs in the use of an application, there is no 
terminating monopoly.”275
 268. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at ¶ 80. 
269. Id.
270.  Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d at 645–46. 
271. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at ¶ 80. 
272. Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Christopher S. Yoo, A Market-Oriented Analysis 
of the “Terminating Access Monopoly” Concept, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 21 (2015). 
273. Id. at 22. 
274. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 136. 
275. Id.
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The multi-homing theory assumes that the subscriber’s multiple platforms 
access more than one Internet account, not just more than one device. 
Subscribers may have home, business, and mobile bundles subject to the same 
terms of service and ISP practices. Customers with separate accounts may
also face similar network management terms across multiple providers. 
The FCC does not account for single-homed IoT devices connected to 
one residential or business account. A connected thermostat, light, battery 
or solar array, or a DER using CAISO’s secure Internet platform to transmit 
signals every four seconds about its visibility, is likely single-homed and 
linked to one Internet account.  Sending a demand response, deployment, 
or grid services signal to another account the subscriber may hold would 
not reach a single-homed thermostat or solar array. Even if a consumer
can control and access their connected thermostat’s data from their phone, 
the Internet-connected thermostat cannot change accounts to circumvent 
ISP delays that favor other applications on the platform the thermostat
uses. Mark Armstrong observed that “platforms have monopoly power over
providing access to their single-homing customers for the multi-homing
side.”276 The energy grid operator or IOU faces a terminating access monopoly 
to reach devices connected to a particular Internet platform at the time the 
signal is sent. Even if a subscriber could switch to another high-speed ISP, 
that switch may lag behind a demand response or load shifting call needed 
for energy reliability, system, or public safety.
The FCC’s 2018 Internet Freedom Order questions whether ISPs have 
sufficient incentives to engage in network management practices that undermine 
access to content as “ISPs themselves recognize that their businesses depend 
on their customers’ demand for edge content.”277  The 2018 Order agrees that
“when a broadband provider acts as a gatekeeper, it actually chokes consumer
demand for the very broadband product it can supply.”278 
The 2018 FCC Order concludes that it is “unlikely that any ISP, except 
the very largest, could exercise market power in negotiations with Google 
or Netflix, but almost certainly no small wireless ISP, or a larger but still
small rural cable company or incumbent LEC, could do so.”279 The FCC
anticipates–without analysis–that Google or Netflix could withstand ISP 
market or gatekeeper power. This conjecture ignores the discretion the 
FCC’s Internet Freedom Order confers on ISPs to charge any content provider, 
whether large or small, for speedy data transmission, or to prevent relegation 
to slow or stalled lanes. 
276. Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. OF ECON. 668, 
669 (2006).
277. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at 117.
 278. Id. 
279. Id. at ¶ 136. 
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The FCC concedes that “platforms must vigorously compete for single-
homing end users, but have less need to compete for edge providers, who 
subscribe to all platforms. This means each ISP faces strong pressures to
cut price to end users, but does not face similar pressures in pricing to 
edge providers.”280  This observation recognizes that ISPs have the ability and 
incentive to demand charges from edge or content providers to reach ISP 
subscribers.




The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order authorizes ISPs to request payments 
to transmit or receive data, apart from ISP subscription fees. Nothing in the 
FCC’s Order precludes ISPs from charging critical infrastructure sectors, 
the government, educational institutions, healthcare providers, or the military
to distribute Internet content, or for protection from paid priority delay.
ISPs could, for example, seek payments from utilities, demand response 
bidders, energy market participants, grid operators, and regulators to ensure 
speedy Internet traffic delivery or prevent diversion to the slow lane.  The 
utility’s legal duty to provide safe, reliable service at just and reasonable 
rates281 increases ISP incentive to seek payment from that utility to stave 
off ISP-induced delays. Payments for priority or protection from Internet 
delays can raise energy prices and erect barriers for Internet-enabled energy 
resources.
My comments to the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet proceeding pointed out
that for “utilities with millions of customers such as [IOU] Southern California 
Edison (SCE) . . . regulated by the CPUC, with over 4.9 million customer 
connections, negotiating Internet access agreements with multiple ISPs to 
reach their 14 million customers would be costly, risky, and fraught with
uncertainty.”282 ISPs may ask utilities to pay to reach customers, their supply 
chain, regulators, public safety personnel, researchers, the media, and others
needed for safe and reliable operations. 
Utilities may seek to recover paid priority costs from energy ratepayers 
through General Rate Case applications to their state PUC. Post-expenditure 
rate recovery applications would be subject to a regulator’s “reasonableness
 280. Id. at ¶ 137 (citations omitted). 
281. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451, supra note 105. 
282. Commissioner Sandoval, 2015 Open Internet Ex Parte Comments, supra note 153, at 
3. 
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review.” If the PUC finds the utility’s conduct was not reasonable, rate
recovery may be denied.  Either utility customers or shareholders will likely
be asked to shoulder the burden and expense of ISP charges to pay for
priority or protect against delayed and degraded service.
The FCC’s 2018 Open Internet Order “expect[s] that eliminating the ban 
on paid prioritization will help spur innovation and experimentation, encourage 
network investment, and better allocate the costs of infrastructure, likely 
benefiting consumers and competition.”283  This projection reflects the
FCC’s expectation that ISPs will charge content providers to access subscribers.
Yet, the FCC failed to analyze the impact of ISP content or paid priority
charges on energy prices, and the prices of other goods and services, an
omission that reflects arbitrary and capricious decision-making.284 
The FCC imagines that ISPs will pass profits from content provider
charges in excess of total costs to subscribers stating that “no ISP can earn 
supranormal profits, so any markups earned from edge providers in excess 
of total costs are generally passed through to [broadband] end users.”285 
The FCC does not explain why it believes ISPs would not keep markups 
as profit. Neither does the potential for content providers to pay for the 
costs of broadband diminish the “waterbed effect” of rising prices in other 
markets such as energy services made to pay ISPs to deliver content on 
the Internet platform.286 
The hypothetical bar to supranormal profits depends on competition for 
broadband services, a goal the FCC has pursued since the dial-up days. 
Competition for High-speed Internet service is limited.287 In 2015 the FCC
defined 25 mbps down and 3 up as high-speed Internet offering “advanced
telecommunications capability.”288 The FCC reported that in 2016, 40% of 
Americans had the choice of only one provider offering high-speed Internet
 283. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 253. 
284. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (“Federal administrative agencies are required
to engage in “reasoned decisionmaking”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S.
at 43 (administrative agency decision-making must consider important issues under the APA). 
285. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at 137 (citing Armstrong, supra note 
276, at 669–70; Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 125 (2009)). 
286. Cf. Katz, supra note 213, at 15 (“there is a ‘waterbed effect’: forcing BIAS providers 
to charge lower prices to edge providers creates incentives for BIAS providers to charge 
higher prices to [broadband] end users.”). 
287. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 125. 
288. In re FCC, INQUIRYCONCERNING THEDEPLOYMENT OFADVANCEDTELECOMMUNICATIONS 
CAPABILITY TO ALL AMERICANS IN A REASONABLE & TIMELY FASHION, & POSSIBLE STEPS
TOACCELERATE SUCHDEPLOYMENT PURSUANT TOSECTION706 OFTHE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 
OF 1996 (as amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 1375, ¶ 3 
(2015) (determining that “advanced telecommunications capability” requires access to
actual download speeds of at least 25 Mbps and actual upload speeds of at least 3 Mbps)).
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at 25 mbps up and 3 down, 45.2% had the choice of two, 5.9% had three, 
while 8.9% had none.289 
Professor van Schweick underscored the lack of competitive alternatives
for Internet speeds of 50 mbps down and 3 up: “61% of homes in the United 
States have only one service provider–the cable provider–that can offer 
peak speeds of more than 50 Mbps down and 3 Mbps up. Only 16% have 
access to two such providers, and 21% do not have access to such service
at all.”290 New entrants to the broadband market face barriers to entry such 
as access to poles, conduits, and rights-of-way already occupied by incumbents, 
and interconnection challenges.291 
G. Promises, No Promises, and Gatekeeper Incentives
The Internet Freedom Order notes that “many ISPs have committed to 
refrain from blocking or throttling lawful Internet conduct notwithstanding 
any Title II regulation,”292 citing comments from AT&T, Comcast, Verizon, 
Cox, and Frontier. The ISP statements upon which the FCC relies “are neither
written in the language of promise nor condition, nor are they integrated into 
user agreements, rendering them unenforceable in contract.”293 
Notably absent from these policy statements is any promise to foreswear 
from paid priority deals. Neither do major ISPs pledge to protect other users
from delayed or degraded service as a result of paid priority. The FCC’s
2018 Internet Freedom Order omits discussion of the absence of ISP promises
 289. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 125. 
290.  van Schewick, supra note 211, at 90–91. 
291. CPUC D.16-12-025, Order Instituting Investigation into the State of Competition 
Among Telecommunications Providers in California, and to Consider and Resolve Questions 
Raised in the Limited Rehearing of Decision 08-09-042, at 3, Dec. 1, 2016 (“Competitive 
bottlenecks and barriers to entry in the telecommunications network limit new network entrants
and may raise prices for some telecommunications services above efficiently competitive 
levels. One particular bottleneck is access to utility poles, where the Commission’s safety
mandate meets, and must be reconciled with, the Commission’s goal of a competitive
market.”); FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 169 (repealing the authority
to consider disputes about Internet carrier interconnection claims, anticipating that parties 
may reach mutually agreeable commercial arrangements).
292. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 117 (citing Comcast Comments at
54–55, 64; Frontier Comments at 6; Cox Comments at 20–21; Verizon Comments at 20; 
AT&T Comments at 101).
293. Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Protect the Open Internet, DAILY J., May 19, 2017, 
available at https://law.scu.edu/news/catherine-sandovals-article-protect-the-open-internet­
published-by-the-daily-journal/ [https://perma.cc/A3TE-GFFX] [hereinafter Protect the Open 
Internet]. 
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to renounce paid priority or to protect other Internet users from degraded 
service from its decision to allow paid priority.  This analytical gap violates
the APA for failure to consider important aspects of the issue in the
administrative proceeding.294 
During my remarks at the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (NARUC) Winter Conference in February 2017, I reported
that on more than one occasion a representative of an ISP told me while I
was a CPUC Commissioner that the ISP could prioritize energy or water utility 
Internet signals if regulators let them do so.295  The ISP representative’s
comments were consistent with their longstanding advocacy of paid priority
deals and their comments subsequently filed in the Internet Freedom Proceeding.
Such remarks communicate ISP willingness and ability to –for a price– 
prioritize energy, water, or other critical infrastructure communication.
The lack of any safeguards for users who do not or cannot pay for priority
reflects the misaligned regulatory incentives the FCC created.  Energy, water, 
and telecommunications utilities face duties under state law to provide 
safe, reliable service, at just and reasonable rates.296  Wholesale energy market 
participants are required to provide reliable service at just and reasonable 
rates under the FPA, and to comply with other federal safety rules.297 The
regulatory incentive mismatch the FCC created between ISPs and Internet
users undermines safe and reliable energy service at just and reasonable
rates. These misaligned incentives recall the circumstances that facilitated
Enron’s market manipulation during California’s energy crisis. 
These risks cannot be resolved by exempting critical infrastructure sectors
from net neutrality repeal. In the energy sector, for example, Internet 
294. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting
Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43); Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign v.
Zinke, 2017 WL 4349012, at *18 (D. Idaho, Sept. 29, 2017, No. 1:16-CV-00001-EJL) (“The 
BLM’s decision in this case is arbitrary and capricious because it did not consider the 
significant impacts its decision may have on the free-roaming nature of the herd [an
important issue in that case] nor explain why its decision is appropriate despite those 
impacts.”) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). 
295. Catherine Sandoval, Panel V. Telecomm Infrastructure and the USF: New
Administration, New Policies, and the Current Fund, Staff Subcommittee on Telecommunications, 
REMARKS TO STAFF SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Feb. 12, 2017 (2017 NARUC
Winter Meeting). 
296. See, e.g., CAL. PUB.UTIL. CODE § 451. 
297. Trope & Humes, supra note 38, at 782 (noting that the Electricity Modernization 
Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.A. § 15801 (2005) (Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109­
58, § 1211, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 8240 (2012)) added section
215 to the Federal Power Act (FPA), which authorized FERC to certify an organization as 
the national “Electric Reliability Organization,” which would be charged with establishing
and enforcing mandatory reliability standards); FPA, 16 U.S.C.A. § 824 (“transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce is necessary in the public interest.”).
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communications are important for utilities, grid managers, and their customers,
suppliers, and regulators.  Customers use the Internet to send demand response 
and DER signals, to enroll in utility programs, use energy data, get updates 
on blackouts and local energy conditions.  Suppliers, regulators, researchers, 
public safety personnel, energy generators, and more, all use the Internet
for energy-related communications.  In the distributed energy ecosystem,
the ability to communicate with a wide range of people and things is crucial
to energy reliability, safety, just and reasonable rates, and the environment.
ISP conduct that unduly slows Internet communication at any point in the 
energy ecosystem puts energy performance and values at risk. 
Following the release of the FCC’s November 2017 draft order permitting 
paid priority, Comcast stated that it “hasn’t entered into any paid prioritization 
agreements. Period. And we have no plans to do so.”298 Jon Brodkin points
out that Comcast’s “public Open Internet commitment says only that ‘We 
do not block, slow down or discriminate against lawful content,’ without
making any statement about whether it will engage in paid prioritization.”299 
“Earlier this year, [Brodkin notes,] the same webpage said that Comcast stated
‘Comcast doesn’t prioritize Internet traffic or create paid fast lanes,’”300 
while later posts dropped the corporate policy against creating fast lanes.301 
The FCC’s 2011 approval of Comcast’s acquisition of NBC required
that Comcast adhere for seven years to the net neutrality rules the FCC 
adopted in 2010, regardless of the outcome of the legal appeal of those 
rules.302  The FCC recognized that Comcast’s acquisition of an interest in 
298. Marguerite Readon, Comcast denies plans to offer internet ‘fast lanes’, CNET, 
Nov. 28, 2017, https://www.cnet.com/news/comcast-denies-plans-to-offer-internet-fast-lanes/
[http://perma.cc/U73Q-E8ZG].
299. Jon Brodkin, Comcast hints at plans for paid fast lanes after net neutrality repeal, 
Comcast still won’t block or throttle but paid priority may be on the way, ARS TECHNICA, 
Nov. 27, 2017, https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/11/comcast-quietly-drops-promise- 
not-to-charge-tolls-for-internet-fast-lanes/ [https://perma.cc/TU6M-J9PB].
F.C.C. Rcd. 4238, 4275 (2011), at 38, available at https://www.fcc.gov/document/applications- 
300. Id.
 301. Id.
 302. In re Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. & NBC Universal, Inc. 26 
comcast-corporation-general-electric-company-and-nbc-1 [https://perma.cc/UV2C-KBLR]
(“The Applicants have agreed that, in their provision of broadband Internet access services, 
neither Comcast nor Comcast-NBCU shall prioritize affiliated Internet content over unaffiliated
Internet content. In addition, any Comcast or Comcast-NBCU broadband Internet access 
service offering that involves caps, tiers, metering, or other usage-based pricing shall not
treat affiliated network traffic differently from unaffiliated network traffic. Comcast and
Comcast-NBCU shall also comply with all relevant FCC rules, including the rules adopted
by the Commission in GN Docket No. 09-191, and, in the event of any judicial challenge
 61
































    
  
 
   
Hulu, which broadcasts entertainment content through the Internet “increased 
risk that Comcast will engage in blocking or discrimination when transmitting 
network traffic over its broadband service.”303 The FCC found “that Comcast’s
acquisition of additional programming content that may be delivered via 
the Internet, or for which other providers’ Internet-delivered content may
be a substitute, will increase Comcast’s incentive to discriminate against
unaffiliated content and distributors in its exercise of control over consumers’
broadband connections.”304 
From December 2010 through January 2014, the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet 
rules required ISP transparency about network management practices, no
blocking, no unreasonable discrimination, and reasonable network 
management.305 The FCC’s 2010 Order provided that ISPs “shall not
unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a
consumer’s broadband Internet access service,” and barred ISPs from 
charging fees to content providers to avoid being blocked.306 
The appeal of that order was decided in January 2014, in Verizon v. 
FCC, leaving the transparency rules in place, but striking other restrictions 
as imposing common carrier rules which were not supported by the FCC’s 
classification of ISPs as information service providers.307 Comcast’s pledge
to observe the 2010 rules survived the appellate court’s decision to strike down 
those rules in 2014, but its pledge expired in January 2018.308  Comcast’s
November 2017 statement that it has no plans to enter into paid priority
arrangements will not constrain its action once that merger condition expires. 
After the June 11, 2018 effective date for the Internet Freedom Order, 
paid priority deals may begin.  Negotiations and arrangements for priority
deals may already be underway.
affecting the latter, Comcast-NBCU’s voluntary commitments concerning adherence
to those rules will be in effect.”).
17931 (GN Docket No. 09-191), Dec. 21, 2010, available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/
 303. Id.
 304. Id.
 305. FCC, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17905,
attachments/FCC-10-201A1_Rcd.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC7Z-BTHK] [hereinafter FCC,
2010 Open Internet Order].
306. Id. at 17943–17944 (emphasis in the original).
307.  Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d at 659. 
308. Jon Brodkin, Comcast to be “unleashed” on rivals when NBC merger conditions
expire, Breakup of Comcast and NBC should be explored, senator says, ARS TECHNICA, 
Dec. 15, 2017, https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/12/comcast-to-be-unleashed-on­
rivals-when-nbc-merger-conditions-expire/ [https://perma.cc/28YN-5S7C] (noting that the 
FCC conditions for FCC approval of Comcast’s acquisition of NBC included “that expire
in January include net neutrality provisions similar to the ones repealed by the FCC yesterday”
on December 14, 2017). 
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H. Antitrust in Lieu of Net Neutrality Protects Only Harm to 

Competition and Leaves Energy Reliability, Safety, 





The 2018 Order cites ISP promises to refrain from “blocking or throttling 
lawful Internet conduct notwithstanding any Title II regulation,” and “existing 
consumer protection and antitrust laws” as sufficient to protect consumers 
from gatekeeper abuse in lieu of net neutrality rules.309  The Internet Freedom
Order fails to discuss the legal principle that antitrust and unfair competition
law remedy only injuries to competition,310 a limitation my August 2017 
Reply Comments to the FCC highlighted.  The FCC failed to consider the 
need to remedy non-competition harms resulting from its decision such as 
those to energy reliability, safety, rates, and the environment, reflecting arbitrary
and capricious decision-making under the APA.311 
FTC Acting Chair Olhausen argued that “[m]arket forces and antitrust 
policy can not only protect competition in ISP-related markets, but also
safeguard nonmonetary goals like free speech and openness, at least to the 
extent that consumers share those values.”312 She contends “assuming for 
now that consumers share the full array of nonmonetary values embraced by 
net neutrality advocates, it follows that ISPs have an incentive in contested
markets to provide broadband access that caters to those values.”313
 309. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 116–117. 
310. Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 34 (citing Atl. 
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. at 334; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–
O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (holding that an antitrust plaintiff must prove injury which
reflects the anticompetitive effect either of the alleged violation or of anticompetitive acts made
possible by the alleged violation of antitrust laws); A.I.B. Express, Inc. v. FedEx Corp.. 358 F. 
Supp. 2d at 246 (“The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or
of the anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.”). 
311. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009) (“a reasoned
explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were 
engendered by the prior policy.”); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 
2125 (2016) (“where the agency has failed to provide even that minimal level of analysis,
its action is arbitrary and capricious and so cannot carry the force of law”) (citing 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (an agency must
“articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a ‘rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
312. Hon. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Antitrust over Net Neutrality: Why We Should Take
Competition in Broadband Seriously, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 119, 133 (2016). 
313. Id. at 143. 
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Energy reliability, safety, just and reasonable rates are legal requirements
of federal and state energy regulation. California law mandates GHG and
black carbon reduction goals for the energy sector.  Whether broadband 
Internet consumers independently value energy laws, they are legal requirements,
the breach of which antitrust law cannot remedy. 
Consumer protection laws offer no safe haven for consumers if the ISP 
limits its promises.  ISPs who do not promise “‘unfettered access to all the 
content, services, and applications that the internet has to offer’”314 or similarly 
broad terms may limit exposure to FTC Act deceptive conduct claims by
tailoring their promises. ISPs who never promise to safeguard consumers 
from slowdowns to accommodate higher paying customers, and never promise
minimum speeds or performance may cite their limited promises to defend
against consumer protection and FTC Act complaints.  ISP terms of service 
may also limit consumer claims for breach of contract.315 
The FCC does not acknowledge that the 2015 Open Internet Order covered 
a broader range of potential harms of blocking, throttling, and paid priority
including those to public safety, free expression, democracy, the environment,
energy, and competition.316 In support of its rules against paid priority, the
FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order cited my comments filed when I served
as a CPUC Commissioner that expressed concern that “paid prioritization 
undermines public safety and universal service, and increases barriers to
adopting Internet-based applications such as Internet-enabled demand
response communications electric and gas utilities use to prevent power 
blackouts, forestall the need to build fossil-fueled power plants, promote 
environmental sustainability, and manage energy resources.”317 
Likewise, the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet rule rejected the argument that 
“only ‘anticompetitive’ discrimination yielding ‘substantial consumer 
harm’ should be prohibited by our rules.”318 The FCC concluded in 2010 
that maintaining an open Internet ecosystem “cannot be achieved by preventing
only those practices that are demonstrably anticompetitive or harmful to 
consumers.”319
 314. Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: 
The Role of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the
Net Neutrality Debate, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 645 (2009). 
315. Sandoval, Protect the Open Internet, supra note 293. 
316. See e.g., FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at 5654–55 n.292 (citing
People of the State of Illinois and State of New York Comments at 6 (asserting that “[i]f 
broadband providers can discriminate among content, they can effectively pick winners and 
losers, interfering with the public’s ability to freely educate itself about political, cultural, 
and social issues–education that is critical to our democracy”).
317. Id. at n.291 (citing Commissioner Sandoval, Ex Parte Letter, supra note 216, at 
2).
318. FCC, 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 305, at ¶ 78. 
319. Id.
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The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order considered the needs of critical 
infrastructure sectors in rejecting proposals to allow for paid priority or 
other individualized negotiations for fast Internet access with a “minimum
speed” guaranteed.320  The 2015 Open Internet Order cited my comments
that paid prioritization could harm public safety and the environment among 
the reasons to ban ISP paid priority.321 
The CPUC’s Comments in the 2017 Internet Freedom Proceeding 
emphasized “as the 2015 Open Internet Order discusses, the absence of
strong anti-discriminatory rules could undermine critical infrastructure and 
public safety.”322  The CPUC cautioned “without non-discriminatory rules,
providers of emergency services or public safety agencies might have to
pay extra for their traffic to have priority.”323 The CPUC warned “[i]f states, 
cities, and counties were required to pay for priority access, their ability to 
provide comprehensive, timely information to the public in a crisis could 
be profoundly impaired.”324 
The Internet Freedom Order repeals enforceable net neutrality protections 
adopted in 2015, without offering a replacement that covers harms the 
previous Order addressed.  This gap leaves internet users including critical
infrastructure sectors and their customers at risk.  The FCC does so by
assuming without explanation that “unaddressed harms are small relative 
to the costs of implementing more heavy-handed regulation.”325 
The Supreme Court in 2016 in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, held 
that the APA requires that “the agency must at least “display awareness
that it is changing position” and “show that there are good reasons for the new 
policy.”326  The “unexplained inconsistency” in agency policy is “a reason 
for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from 
320. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at 49 n.254 (citing Commissioner
Sandoval, Ex Parte Letter, supra note 216, Attachment at 14 (“[A]ny of the minimum 
level of access standards the FCC proposes would be insufficient to support the needs of 
a diversity of Internet users including Critical Infrastructure.”).
321. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at 55 n.291 (citing Commissioner
Sandoval, Ex Parte Letter, supra note 216, at 2). 
322. CPUC, Comments, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, at 29 (WC
Docket No. 17-108) (July 17, 2017) (citing 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 F.C.C. Rcd.
5601, ¶¶ 114, 126, 150). 
323. Id.
324. CPUC, Comments, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, at 29.
 325. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 116. 
326.  Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. at 2126.
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agency practice.”327 “An ‘arbitrary and capricious’ regulation of this sort
is itself unlawful and receives no Chevron deference” to an administrative
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute.328 A reviewing court is
not authorized to conjecture an explanation the agency did not offer. It is 
a “foundational principle” that “a court may uphold agency action only on
the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action.”329  These 
omissions are fatal flaws under the APA, providing grounds for vacatur of
the Order, and remand to the FCC for a new proceeding in light of the
massive infection of the Internet Freedom Comment Process.330 
VIII. CALL OF DUTY: PROTECT THE OPEN INTERNET, ENERGY 

RELIABILITY, SAFETY, JUST AND REASONABLE 

RATES, AND ENVIRONMENTAL GAINS THROUGH 





A. State Action to Protect Energy Reliability, Public Safety, Just and 
Reasonable Rates, and the Environment 
Several states are suing to overturn the FCC’s net neutrality repeal.331 
Twenty-nine state legislatures have introduced net neutrality legislation; 
three states, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington, have enacted neutrality 
legislation as of June 11, 2018, the effective date of the FCC’s net neutrality
repeal.332 Governors of six states−Hawaii, Vermont, New Jersey, New
York, Washington, and Montana−have signed legislation requiring ISPs 
to observe net neutrality rules to be eligible for state contracts.333
 327. Id. at 2126 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X, 545 U.S. 967, 
981 (2005)).
328. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)).
329. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2710 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp. 318 U.S. at 87). 
330. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d at 1048. 
331. Klint Finley, After FCC Abandons Net Neutrality, State Take Up Fight, WIRED, 
Dec. 15, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/after-fcc-abandons-net-neutrality-states­
take-up-the-fight/ [https://perma.cc/A7M2-4BVV] (reporting New York Attorney General
Eric Schneiderman said he would lead a multistate lawsuit against the FCC to preserve net 
neutrality regulations). 
332. Danielle Dean, Net Neutrality Legislation by State, NCSL, Aug. 27, 2018, http:// 
www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/net-neutrality­
legislation-in-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/TKZ6-BNDC].
333. Ryan Johnson, Vermont Governor Becomes 5th to issue net neutrality order,
STATE SCOOP, Feb. 20, 2018, http://www.statescoop.com/Vermont-Governor-Becomes­
5th-to-protect-net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/EP72-TSKJ].
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The FCC’s Open Internet Order contends that its policy of deregulation 
preempts inconsistent state action.334 That Order purports to “preempt any 
state or local measures that would effectively impose rules or requirements
that we have repealed or decided to refrain from imposing in this order or 
that would impose more stringent requirements for any aspect of broadband
service that we address in this order.”335 While a full analysis of preemption 
is beyond this Article’s scope, some observations are offered to examine 
the legal infirmities of the Internet Freedom Order’s attempt to preempt
states and state PUCs.
Preemption can occur through three mechanisms: 
(1) where Congress expressly specifies that its enactment preempts state law 
(express preemption); (2) where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive 
that there is a reasonable inference Congress intended to dominate the field and
state laws on the same subject are precluded (field preemption); and (3) where 
federal law actually conflicts with state law and it is impossible for a private party 
to comply with both requirements (conflict preemption).336 
The FCC’s Order leaves harms created by its rules−such as harms to energy
reliability, safety, costs, and the environment, as well as harms to democracy 
and national security−without a remedy under federal law.  This remedy and
regulatory gap reveals that the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order has not 
pervasively occupied the field, so its adoption did not result in field 
preemption of state law.
Chris Laughlin argues on behalf of the Institute for Public Representation, 
Georgetown University that “once broadband is classified as an information 
service, the FCC lacks authority to impose any conduct rules on ISPs. The 
Commission cannot thereafter assert that it has a policy goal of removing
 334. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 194 n.726 (citing cf., e.g., Ark. 
Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 383 (1983) (“[A] federal decision 
to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that
the area is best left unregulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force 
as a decision to regulate.”) (emphasis added by the FCC Order); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. 
N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 774 (1947) (state regulation precluded
“where failure of the federal officials affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes on 
the character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the 
policy of the statute”); Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 580–81 (8th Cir. 
2007) (“[D]eregulation” is a “valid federal interest[] the FCC may protect through preemption
of state regulation.”)).
335. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 195. 
336. Monarch v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1197, 1204–05 (1999)
(citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990); Indus. Truck Ass’n, Inc. v.
Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir.1997)). 
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regulations for something over which it has no authority.”337 Thus, no conflict
preemption occurs.338 
States have authority under the police power inherent in our federalist
system to “legislate with regard to protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons.”339 The CPUC’s comments opposing net 
neutrality’s repeal stressed, the “CPUC and California utilities have an 
obligation under state law to protect the safety and health of the public.
Protection of public safety is a core exercise of a state’s police powers . . . .”340 
The CPUC emphasized the “FCC cannot diminish this state police power to 
protect public safety and welfare, notwithstanding whether it reclassifies
BIAS [Broadband Internet Access Service], or otherwise attempts to preempt
state action regarding utility poles.”341 
The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order does not diminish state authority under 
state constitution and state statutes to ensure utility safety, reliability, just 
and reasonable rates, and compliance with state environmental laws.342 
The FCC’s attempt to preempt states exceeds its statutory authority and 
must be vacated.343
 337. Cf. Letter from Chris Laughlin, Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown 
University, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary-Federal Communications Commission, on Restoring
Internet Freedom, WB Docket No. 17-108, at 3, Dec. 7, 2017, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/ 
1207093350065/OTI%20Preemption%20Ex%20Parte.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5YF-XX27]. 
338. Id. at 2 (citing Cal. v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1242 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that
conflict or impossibility preemption requires that the Commission “demonstrate that the order is
narrowly tailored to preempt only such state regulations as would negate valid FCC regulatory
goals.”)). 
339.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
340. CPUC Comments, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket
No. 17-108, at 5, available at https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/107172199528427/WC%20Docket 
%20No.%2017-108%20CPUC%20Comments%20on%20Restoring%20Internet%20Freedom.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3UZZ-YL7R]. The police power is an attribute of a state’s sovereignty 
and is an essential element of the power to govern, which is reserved to the states. 72 Am.
Jur. 2d States, etc. § 21 (citing CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996)
(as amended Jan. 13, 1997); Baton Rouge v. Ross, 654 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1995); Norfolk &
W. Ry. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 489 Pa. 109, 413 A.2d 1037 (1980) (rejected on other
grounds by, Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton Inc, 620 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2010))). 
341. CPUC, Comments, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, at 5.
 342. Cf. Laughlin, supra note 337, at 2 (noting that the Communications Act of 1934
Section 152(b) prohibits the FCC from exercising “jurisdiction with respect to . . . charges, 
classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate
communication service by wire or radio of any carrier.”) (emphasis added by Laughlin); 
Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(finding that section 152(b) “fences off from FCC reach or regulation intrastate matters”)). 
343. All Am. Telephone Co., Inc. v. FCC, 867 F.3d 81, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“An order
from the Commission that exceeds the scope of its statutory authority is, by definition, not
in accordance with the law and subject to vacatur. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 
406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2005).”).
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Some ISPs or their affiliates hold a state or PUC Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN), Franchise, or license (collectively
referred to as a “state license”) used to obtain access to poles, conduits, and 
rights of way to deploy physical facilities that provide Internet service. State
PUCs must ensure that ISPs comply with state license terms, and not undermine
the operation, reliability, and safety of other utilities. 
State PUCs should ask entities under their jurisdiction to report to the
state Commission any ISP requests for payment or anything of value for 
Internet priority or protection against delayed or degraded service. Most
state PUCs have extensive authority to request records of entities under
their jurisdiction and from license, franchise, or authority holders.344  This
information will allow state PUCs to monitor paid priority requests and 
take action to protect public safety and the reliability of utility services. 
States and ISOs should also examine whether energy market participant 
paid priority deals or offerings, including those through affiliated company
deals with aggregators, are consistent with energy market rules. 
B. Risky Business: SEC Rules Require Firms to Disclose Significant 
Risks to Operations Including Cybersecurity Risks
This Article contends that publicly-traded companies that rely on the
Internet for their operations including energy utilities must report in their 
SEC disclosures the increased risk of ISP gatekeeping behavior from the 
FCC’s repeal of net neutrality rules and the limited reasonable network
management exception. For firms highly dependent on the Internet, ISP 
disruptions or delays may constitute “significant factors that make the offering 
speculative or risky” under Item 503, triggering SEC reporting requirements.345 
The “sufficiency of Item 503(c) disclosures generally tracks the materiality 
standard under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act.”346 “Disclosure is
fundamental to the intersection of securities law and cybersecurity as 
344. CPUC § 313 (“The commission may require, by order served on any public
utility, the production within this State at such time and place as it designates, of any books,
accounts, papers, or records kept by the public utility in any office or place without this 
State, or, at its option, verified copies in lieu thereof, so that an examination thereof may 
be made by the commission or under its direction.”). 
345.  17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c). 
346. Plymouth Cty. Ret. Ass’n v. Primo Water Corp., 966 F. Supp. 2d 525, 561 
(M.D.N.C. 2013) (citing City of Roseville Emp. Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. 
Supp. 2d 395, 426 (S.D.N.Y.2011)). 
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investors depend on the transparency disclosures provide to make 
investment decisions.”347 
ISP-induced delays resulting from the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order
may also constitute a reportable cybersecurity risk under Item 503(c). SEC 
cybersecurity risk reporting guidelines recognize cyber acts that deliberately 
slow business operations as reportable.348 
Some corporations have recognized and discussed the risk of net neutrality 
repeal in their SEC filings.  In the Internet Freedom Docket the Benton
Foundation filed its 2017 review of SEC filings reporting that 26 companies 
expressed concerns about the risks of ISP gatekeeping behavior to their
operation.349 Among those reporting risks to business operations if net
neutrality rules were repealed was APX Group Holdings, Inc., a large smart
home and security product and services company which operates under the
brand name Vivint.350 APX uses the Internet to offer home energy management,
and reported in its December 31, 2016 10-K: 
Our operations depend upon third-party cellular and other telecommunications providers
to communicate signals to and from our subscribers in a timely, cost-efficient and
consistent manner. The failure of one or more of these providers to transmit and 
communicate signals in a timely manner could affect our ability to provide services to
our subscribers. There can be no assurance that third-party telecommunications providers
and signal-processing centers will continue to transmit and communicate signals
to or from our third-party providers and the monitoring stations without disruption.
Any such disruption, particularly one of a prolonged duration, could have a material 
adverse effect on our business.351 
APX’s March 2018 10-K explained that its services “are accessed through
the Internet and our security monitoring services are increasingly delivered 
using Internet technologies,” while Vivint’s “distributed cloud storage solution 
. . . is dependent upon Internet services for shared storage.”352 Failure to
timely transmit internet signals harms not only APX’s security and home
347. Dustin Mauck & Kornel Rady, Cybersecurity Meets Securities: What Should Be
Done, 45 No. 3 SEC. REG. L.J. art. 3 (Fall 2017). 
348. Id.
349. Benton Foundation, Notice of Ex Parte, Nov. 17, 2017 (WC 17-108) (Attaching
memo containing research of SEC filings conducted by Jaime Petenko, Associate, Institute
for Technology Law & Policy at Georgetown Law), https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/11171233 
430900. 
350. APX Group Holdings Inc., Investor Relations (Operating under the brand name 
Vivint.  “Vivint is a leading provider of smart home technology. Vivint delivers services 
through a cloud-based platform that integrates a wide range of wireless features and components 




351. APX Dec. 2016 10-K, supra note 243, at 16. 
352. APX March 2018 10-K, supra note 245, at 20. 
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energy business and electric grid reliability; it also puts at risk APX subscriber 
safety.
APX’s December 2016 10-K discusses risks that some broadband providers 
may take actions such as “degrading the quality of the data packets we
transmit over their lines, giving those packets low priority, giving other packets 
higher priority than ours, blocking our packets entirely or attempting to
charge their customers more for using our services or terminating the 
customer’s contract.”353 APX’s March 2018 10-K warned: 
Some providers of broadband access may take measures that affect their customers’
ability to use these products and services, such as degrading the quality of the
data packets we transmit over their lines, giving those packets low priority, giving
other packets higher priority than ours, blocking our packets entirely or attempting to
charge their customers more for using our services or terminating the customer’s 
contract.354 
The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order allows ISPs to engage in the precise 
conduct APX identified as a material risk. SEC reports must reflect this 
increased risk. 
Buying paid priority is insufficient to mitigate risks. To ensure Internet
traffic is not delayed, firms would also have to pay every ISP that provides 
service to its customers, suppliers, regulators, and others in its business and
regulatory chain. Those steps may not cover all incoming and outgoing
Internet traffic. The FCC’s Order does not mention the transaction costs
of negotiating paid priority deals.355  Neither did the FCC calculate paid
priority costs for Internet users. Nor did the FCC discuss the costs and
consequences of delayed or stymied transmissions for those without priority.
Failure to consider important aspects of these problems or to explain its
analysis of these costs and consequences violates the APA.356 
Firms should evaluate the business and operational risks, SEC reporting 
obligations, and regulatory duties the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order creates. 
My June 2018 review of the Edgar database of SEC filings found several 
companies that reported concerns about operational risks raised by the 
353. APX Dec. 2016 10-K, supra note 243, at 16. 
354. APX March 2018 10-K, supra note 245, at 20. 
355. Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 50.
356. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (“An action is arbitrary
and capricious “if the agency. . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before 
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.”). 
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repeal of net neutrality.357 That June 2018 Edgar search of the Utility and 
Transportation Sector Industrial Code found no SEC filings by electric, natural 
gas, or water utilities discussing concerns about net neutrality repeal. Neither
PG&E, nor SCE, nor SDG&E, major electric IOUs that serve California, filed 
SEC disclosures listing the operational, investment, and cybersecurity risk
arising from net neutrality’s repeal. Firms facing increased risks due to the
Internet Freedom Order including energy, water, and communications
utilities and regulated entities, should include those risks in their SEC 
filings. 
This Article recommends that firms for whom the Internet is integral to
its business (a category which includes small businesses such as hairdressers
to large investor-owned or municipal utilities), should object to Congress,
the states, and in court proceedings about the FCC’s lack of consideration of
the risks to business operations and cybersecurity that depend on the
open Internet.  Such firms should also support state and federal legislation to
restore enforceable net neutrality rules. While the U.S. Senate passed Senate 
Joint Resolution 52 on May 16, 2018 to use the Congressional Review
Act to restore net neutrality by repealing the FCC’s Internet Freedom
Order, the House has not brought that resolution to the floor for a vote.358 
The legal uncertainty about net neutrality exposes firms, families, institutions, 
critical infrastructure, and democracy to risks that require SEC disclosures 
and merit action to protect the Internet and Internet users. 
357. See, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RESEARCHING PUBLIC
COMPANIES THROUGH EDGAR:AGUIDE FOR INVESTORS, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/ searchedgar/ 
webusers.htm [https://perma.cc/E3FX-CPNL].  DocuSign Inc. (Form 10-Q) (filed June 8, 
2018), at 45,  https://seekingalpha.com/filings/pdf/12805767.pdf ([https://perma.cc/2XCT-359A]
(“To the extent network operators attempt to interfere with our services, extract fees from us
to deliver our solution or otherwise engage in discriminatory practices, our business could be
adversely impacted.  With such a regulatory environment, we could experience discriminatory or
anti-competitive practices that impede our domestic and international growth, cause us to 
incur additional expense or otherwise negatively affect our business.”); Roku Inc. (Form 
10-Q) 46 (May 11, 2018), https://ir.roku.com/node/7141/html [https://perma.cc/NX6L­
86KY] (“To the extent the courts or the agencies do not uphold or adopt sufficient safeguards
to protect against discriminatory conduct, network operators may seek to extract fees from us
or our content publishers to deliver our traffic or otherwise engage in blocking, throttling or
other discriminatory practices, and our business could be harmed.”).
358. S.J. Res. 52, A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under 
chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Federal Communications
Commission related to “Restoring Internet Freedom,” Congress.gov (as passed by Senate, 
May 16, 2018, pending in the House), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate- 
joint-resolution/52 [https://perma.cc/C6QG-JUDE].
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C. APA Deficiencies Merit Freedom Order’s Vacatur 

and Remand for a New Proceeding to Protect  

the Open Internet 

Several State Attorneys General and public interest organizations announced
their intent to file suit to challenge the FCC’s net neutrality repeal decision 
as legally deficient, and have since filed along with other government and
public interest petitioners.359  This Article argues that the FCC’s failure to
consider the effects of net neutrality repeal on the energy reliability, safety,
costs, and the environment, and its failure to consider critical infrastructure cyber
security, safety, and operational concerns is arbitrary and capricious under 
the APA.360 The FCC’s order failed to discuss consequences of paid priority 
for other users beyond glib consideration of projections that delay would not 
“typically” be experienced for email, software updates, and cached video.361 
This is insufficient analysis under the APA, which requires consideration and
discussion of important issues.362 “An arbitrary and capricious regulation
of this sort is itself unlawful and receives no Chevron deference.”363 
The submission of comments that allegedly used identity theft to advocate 
a position in the Internet Freedom Docket criminally hijacks democratic
decision-making tools.364 My August 2017 remarks to the Conference of
Western Attorneys General and my Reply Comments filed that month urged 
FCC, state, and federal investigations into the identity theft and false filing 
allegations perpetrated in the FCC Internet Freedom Proceeding.365 The
New York Attorney General’s Office reported in December 2017 that “as 
many as two million comments misused the identities of real Americans,
including over 100,000 comments per state from New York, Florida, Texas, 
359. Finley, supra note 331. 
360.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
361. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 258 (citing AT&T Comments 
at 44-45). 
362. Cal. v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505, 1511 (9th Cir. 1993); Anglers of the Au Sable v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F. Supp. 2d 812, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“The Forest Service’s 
failure to consider important aspects of the problem before approving [exploratory gas and 
oil] drilling [on a parcel of land within a nation forest] constitutes arbitrary and capricious 
agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.”). 
363. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (citing United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227). 
364. See Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 13. 
365. See Conference of Western Attorneys General, Speaker, Panel on FCC and Internet 
Regulation, Aug. 17, 2017, https://meetings.cwagweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/
AGENDA-Master-7.26.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/JNR4-UM3J].
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and California.”366 The New York AG’s Office created tools that continue
to identify false comments filed in the FCC’s Internet Freedom Docket.367 
The FCC’s tolerance of false filings based on identity theft fails the most
basic tenants of fairness required by the APA. The D.C. Circuit in Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, found that irregularities in the procedural conduct of 
an FCC rulemaking constituted arbitrary and capricious decision-making in
violation of the APA.368 The FCC’s conduct of the Internet Freedom
Rulemaking exceeds the procedural irregularities of Prometheus by
countenancing criminal behavior in the comment process. The FCC’s apparent 
tolerance of criminal conduct in this proceeding demonstrates “willful and
unreasoning disregard of the facts and circumstances,” and arbitrary and 
capricious decision-making in violation of the APA.369 
The FCC’s 2018 Open Internet Order asserts that the Commission complied 
with the APA’s obligation to adequately consider “important aspect[s] of 
the problem,”370 consider all “relevant matter” received, and to “reasonably 
respond to those comments that raise significant problems.”371 This Article
contends that the FCC did not consider “important aspect[s] of the problem”
including the range of consequences of paid priority delays for other Internet
users and uses such as energy management and public safety.372 
366. Office of Attorney General Barbara G. Underwood, State of New York, A.G. 
Schneiderman Releases New Details on Investigation Into Fake Net Neutrality Comments, 
Dec. 13, 2017, https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-releases-new-details­
investigation-fake-net-neutrality-comments [https://perma.cc/26WV-UNTD].
367. Id. (reporting that as of December 13, 2017 “over 5,000 people have filed reports 
with the Attorney General’s office regarding identities used to submit fake comments to 
the Federal Communications Commission on the repeal of net neutrality, on which the 
FCC is scheduled to vote tomorrow, December 14, 2017. People can check whether their 
identity was misused and report it to the Attorney General’s office at ag.ny.gov/Fake
Comments.”).
368.  652 F.3d 431, 450 (3d Cir. 2011). 
369. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 547
(D.C. Cir. 1969), available at https://www.leagle.com/decision/1969968425f2d5431836 [https://
perma.cc/ C7L8-9AVF].
370. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 344 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). 
371. Id. (citing Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. v. FCC, 661 F.3d 54, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (refusing to
credit a three-sentence comment with no supporting evidence); North Carolina v. FAA,
957 F.2d 1125, 1135 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting an agency “need not respond to every comment”); 
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978)
(“[C]omments must be significant enough to step over a threshold requirement of materiality
before any lack of consideration becomes of concern.”); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfr. v. EPA, 650
F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting an agency needs to address only “the more significant 
comments”).
372. Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The Commission is 
required to consider public safety by both its enabling act.  See Communications Act of 
1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 … and the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of
1999 § 3, 47 U.S.C. § 615”); Public Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 
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The FCC’s Order does not provide any systematic analysis of public
comment filed as Express Comments, or address the identity theft allegations
in the comments filed in this proceeding. The FCC Order states the “Commission
focused its review of the record on the submitted comments that bear
substantively on the legal and public policy consequences of the actions 
we take today.”373 The FCC notes “it appears that 7.5 million identical one- 
sentence comments were submitted from about 45,000 unique e-mail addresses, 
all generated by a single fake e-mail generator website. Moreover, we received
over 400,000 comments supporting Internet regulation that purported to 
be from the same mailing address in Russia.”374 The FCC contends its
“decision to restore Internet Freedom did not rely on comments devoid of 
substance, or the thousands of identical or nearly identical non-substantive 
comments that simply convey support or opposition to the proposals in
the Internet Freedom NPRM.”375 
The Order reports in a footnote that “the Commission devoted substantial
resources to a review and evaluation of the content of the approximately 
23 million express comments filed in this proceeding, which are shorter 
submissions that are made directly into a web form and do not require 
supporting file attachments.”376 The FCC reports that “Staff individually
analyzed distinct form comments and standard or unique comments for
substantive issues, and developed a systematic process for review of the
non-form, non-standard comments, consistent with the recommendations 
of the Administrative Conference of the United States.”377  The Order contains
few citations to comments filed by individuals through the Express Comment 
portal.378 The Order provides no synopsis of the staff analysis of the
comments. 
The FCC created the “Express Comment” category to make it easy to file
short comments, but neither its web site nor the Internet Freedom NPRM
indicate that express comments will be treated differently than other comments 
1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“the final rule is arbitrary and capricious because the agency
neglected to consider a statutorily mandated factor.”).”).
function of ISPs is to simply transfer packets and not process information, citing comments 
373. 
374. 
FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 344. 
Id. at n.1178. 
375. 
376. 
Id. at ¶ 344. 
Id. at n.1182. 
377. Id. 
378. See e.g. id., supra note 176 (rejecting commenters’ assertions that the primary
including Harold Hallikainen Comments at 1; Ryan Blake Comments at 1–2). 
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filed in the proceeding.379 The FCC did not cite or discuss any of the 1,835 
Express Comments containing the text “lack of competition.”380 Some of
those comments contest the basis for the FCC’s conclusion that “in this
industry, even two active suppliers in a location can be consistent with a 
noticeable degree of competition, and in any case, can be expected to produce 
more efficient outcomes than any regulated alternative.”381 
The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order contends that it has complied with
APA obligations to “reasonably respond to those comments that raise
significant problems.”382 The FCC’s conclusion cites the Supreme Court’s
decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council which requires that under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) “comments must be significant enough to step over a 
threshold requirement of materiality before any lack of consideration
becomes of concern.”383 Vermont Yankee interpreted the “threshold test” 
under NEPA that “places upon an agency the obligation to consider every
significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action.”384 
Vermont Yankee did not establish a “threshold requirement of materiality” 
for consideration of comments under the APA. 
The FCC’s disregard of the vast majority of public comments filed as 
“Express Comments” does not cure the identity theft and false comment
infection of its proceeding.385 The statute governing federal rulemaking, 5
U.S.C. 553, requires the agency to seek and take public comment into account, 
and explain its reasoning relevant to those comments,386 not to treat the
 379. See Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 21 (“The 
FCC cannot now change its policy sub silent[i]o and wholesale discount comments filed through the
Express Comment portal or ignore the allegations of identity theft and false filings being
committed in the FCC proceeding through the FCC record and comment filing system.”). 
380. ECFS Search for filings with the term in full text “lack of competition,” for 
Rulemaking 17-108, conducted on Feb. 18, 2018, https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/filings?
proceedings_name=17-108&q=%22lack%20of%20competition%22&sort=date_
disseminated,DESC [https://perma.cc/TE9K-CHAP].
381. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 126. 
382. Id. at ¶ 344, n.1177. 
383. Id. (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. at 553). 
384. Id.
385. The FCC created the “Express Comment” category to make it easy to file short 
comments, but neither its web site nor the Internet Freedom NPRM indicate that express 
comments will be treated different than other comments filed in the proceeding. See Sandoval,
Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 21. 
386. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (“An agency
must consider and respond to significant comments received during the period for public 
comment.” (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971)); Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1265 (D. Wyo.
2004) (vacating the Record of Decision of the National Park Service’s Final Environmental 
Impact report regarding a snowmobile ban in Yellowstone and Grand Teton National 
Parks finding that “a predetermined political decision that did not seriously consider public
76














   
   
  
 
     
 
 
    











[VOL. 9:  1, 2017–18] Net Neutrality 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
public like an “interloper.”387 The FCC may not dismiss or diminish public
comment in its rulemaking by according public comment little weight or 
analysis, and failing to analyze allegations of criminal manipulation of the 
public comment process.388 
The FCC “reject[ed] calls to delay adoption of this Order out of concerns
that certain non-substantive comments (on which the Commission did not 
rely) may have been submitted under multiple different names or allegedly ‘fake’
names.”389  The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order does not discuss the allegations,
including those my Reply Comments raised, that some of those comments are
not merely “fake,” but were allegedly based on identity theft.390 
The FCC cites Vermont Yankee for its contention that the “Commission 
is under no legal obligation to adopt any ‘procedural devices beyond what
the APA requires, such as identity-verification procedures.”391 The Court
in Vermont Yankee rejected the contention that procedural devices such as 
a formal hearing were necessary under the APA or NERA.392 The holding 
that NEPA does not require a formal hearing is inapposite to the steps necessary
to insure the integrity of the notice and comment rulemaking process. 
The FCC’s 2018 Order stated that “the Commission has previously decided 
not to apply its internal rules regarding false statements in the rulemaking 
context because we do not want “to hinder full and robust public participation
in such policymaking proceedings by encouraging collateral wrangling 
comments and performed mere pro forma compliance with NEPA [National Environmental
Protection Act]” and that the agency ignored the “purposes and procedures of NEPA and
the APA.”). 
387. See supra note 370, at 546. 
388. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply
Comments, supra note 4, at 17. 
389. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 345 (citing see, e.g., Brian Fung,
FCC net neutrality process ‘corrupted’ by fake comments and vanishing consumer complaints, 




390. Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 1–3, 6–25, 58. 
391. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 345, n.1180 (citing Vermont 
Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 548); cf. Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note
4, at 9–10 (recommending that the FCC comment filing system should “display a note
informing filers that submission constitutes the filer’s certification under penalty of perjury
that the filer is authorized to submit the material on behalf of the named commenter.”).
392. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 529, 548. 
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over the truthfulness of the parties’ statements.”393 The Internet Freedom
NPRM provided no notice that the FCC intended to apply this standard to
the Internet Freedom Rulemaking.  Neither did it examine whether this 
standard should be adjusted in light of the bot filings the FCC allows.394 
The FCC anticipated in 2003 that “[w]e do not see rulemakings of general 
applicability and declaratory rulings as raising enforcement issues of the 
same urgency” as adjudicatory and investigatory proceedings.395 “While we
expect parties to be truthful in rulemakings and declaratory ruling proceedings,” 
the FCC commented, “we are mindful that such proceedings typically involve
wide-ranging discussions of general policy rather than specific facts to be 
weighed in an adjudicatory manner.”396 
The FCC’s 2003 ruling did not anticipate false filings allegedly made 
by impersonating others.  Such criminal conduct, and the FCC’s blind eye 
to corrosive impact of allegedly falsified comments based on identity theft, 
achieves the opposite of the FCC’s stated goal of “full and robust public 
participation.”397 
Federal Rulemaking under 47 U.S.C. § 553(c) requires that “the agency
shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking 
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without 
opportunity for oral presentation.”398 The notice-and-comment rulemaking
statute, 47 U.S.C. § 553(c), does not provide a license to file comments by
purloining other people’s identities.399  Neither does the rulemaking statute 
or the APA allow the agency to ignore such conduct which distorts the 
administrative record before the court, the agency, Congress, and the public. 
The FCC has taken no public steps to separate out false from authentic
comments, and cannot create a record with integrity as required by the 
APA “without analyzing which [comments] are false and which are authentic, 
and who is behind the manipulation of the FCC’s decision-making process.”400
 393. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 345, n.1181 (citing Amendment of
Section 1.17 of the Commission’s Rules Concerning Truthful Statements to Commission, 
citing GN Docket No. 02-37, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 4016, 4021–22, ¶ 13 (2003)); 47
CFR § 1.17.). 
394. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(“It is, of course, elementary in our law that rulemaking requires notice sufficient to “fairly
apprise interested persons of the ‘subjects and issues’ before the Agency.”). Cf. In
Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 F.C.C. Rcd.
4434, ¶¶ 120–122 (2017) (describing Comment Filing Procedures but making no reference 
to a proposal not to apply the truthfulness standard of 47 CFR § 1.17, or the 2003 decision
in 18 FCC Rcd 4016). 
395. 
396. 





FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 345, n.1181. 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d at 449 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)).
Id. at 17. 
400. Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 20.
78








   
 









    





       
     
    
 
 
[VOL. 9:  1, 2017–18] Net Neutrality 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
“False filings based on identity theft hack the tools of democratic decision- 
making for an ulterior motive,” my Reply Comments emphasized.401 The
FCC’s Internet Freedom Proceeding flunks the APA. 
The D.C. Circuit recognized that “when the Commission commits legal 
error, the proper remedy is one that puts the parties in the position they would 
have been in had the error not been made.”402 In light of the seriousness
of the FCC’s APA errors, vacatur is warranted.403 
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article explores an overlooked topic in academic and policy debates 
about net neutrality: the importance of an open and neutral Internet to electric
reliability, safety, cost reduction, and harnessing competitive energy sources
including renewables that reduce the energy sector’s GHG and carbon
emissions. A decade of Smart Grid investments embedded communications
and information technology and services including the open Internet throughout 
the distributed energy ecosystem.  These investments unlocked energy resources 
such as demand response and DERS located at customer households, businesses,
and a variety of locations. The distributed nature of critical infrastructure
sectors such as energy, water, health care, underscore the need for open 
and neutral Internet access for all American businesses, families, and institutions.
The FCC Internet Freedom Order’s decision to allow ISPs to manage 
the Internet in their business interest, remove legally enforceable prohibitions
against ISP blocking and throttling, allow paid priority even if it degrades 
other users and uses, and permit ISPs to collect revenues from any content 
provider, constitute cyber security threats to critical infrastructure under 
CIPA.404 The FCC’s failure to consider the consequences of its net neutrality
repeal decision for critical infrastructure, national security, the environment, 
401. Id. at 13. 
402. AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 448 F.3d 426, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Exxon Co. v. 
FERC, 182 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 988
F.2d 154, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
403. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d at 1048 (citing Allied-Signal, 
Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d at 150–51 (“The decision whether to vacate 
depends on the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the
agency chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may 
itself be changed.”)).
404. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5195c. 
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public safety, freedom of expression, and democracy constitutes arbitrary 
and capricious decision-making in violation of the APA.405 
The FCC’s unfathomable tolerance of identity theft in its proceeding, 
delayed investigation, and other irregularities in its comment process 
constitute grounds for vacating the FCC’s Order.406  The Internet Freedom
Order’s failure to discuss public comment filed through the Express Comment
process manifests the FCC’s apparent plan to ignore the millions of Americans 
who submitted comment in this proceeding. The FCC’s conduct demonstrates 
“willful and unreasoning disregard of the facts and circumstances.”407 This
is the worst FCC comment process I have witness in my nearly twenty-five
years of practice in this field.  The FCC’s inexcusably poor comment process 
and dismissive attitude toward public comment disrespects the public, abrogates 
the FCC’s duties under the Communications Act, and constitutes arbitrary 
and capricious decision-making in violation of the APA.408 
Critical infrastructure sector participants and regulators including state
PUCs, FERC, local, and tribal governments should support the repeal
of the Internet Freedom Decision to ensure that ISPs are not able to exercise
their gatekeeper power over the Internet. States, state PUCs, municipal
utility regulators, local and tribal governments, as well as FERC should 
use their jurisdiction to ensure that ISP conduct does not compromise public 
safety, energy reliability, safe utility operations, just and reasonable utility
rates, and the environment. 
Firms with SEC reporting obligations whose business materially depends
on the Internet must inform investors under Item 503(c) about the increased 
risks including cyber security risks the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order poses 
for their operations.  Those firms should also support state and federal 
legislation to restore enforceable net neutrality rules as the FCC failed to fully 
consider the repeal Order’s risks to American business and the economy.
Congress Member Blackburn introduced a bill to codify a ban on ISP
blocking and throttling, but her bill allows paid priority and preempts any 
state net neutrality laws such as those introduced in California and
405. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; Cal. v. FCC, 4
F.3d at 1511; Anglers of the Au Sable v. U.S. Forest Service, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 816 (“The Forest 
Service’s failure to consider important aspects of the problem before approving [exploratory
gas and oil] drilling [on a parcel of land within a nation forest] constitutes arbitrary and
capricious agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.”).
406. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d at 1048; Prometheus Radio
Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d at 450. 
407.  Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d at 547. 
408. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d at 450; Office of Commc’n of 
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d at 547. 
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Washington.409  The Internet Association, a coalition that includes Amazon,
Google, Microsoft, and other companies, opposed the bill stating. “The 
proposal circulated today does not meet the criteria for basic net neutrality
protections.”410  Congress is unlikely to pass a bill on net neutrality in this
session. Under the current structure of the Communications Act, only
classification of ISPs under Title II can be used to prohibit ISP discriminatory
conduct such as blocking, throttling, and paid priority.411 
More than a decade ago Susan Crawford argued for the need “to reframe 
communications law to support what matters.”412 “What matters are 
communications themselves, and the increasingly diverse and valuable ideas 
they produce,” Professor Crawford argued.413 In 2018, energy sector Internet-
based communications between people and things supports innovation, 
research, competition, energy reliability, public safety, just and reasonable 
rates, and environmental protection. A user-centric principle of Internet
governance that considers the needs of critical infrastructure sectors and 
the public they serve is necessary to protect America’s economy, national
security, public safety, environment, and democracy. Legally enforceable
net neutrality rules grounded in Title II of the Communications Act prevent 
ISP gatekeeping behavior.  Net neutrality powers energy and forestalls climate 
change, and merits continued support.
 409. Adi Robertson, The Republican Net Neutrality Bill Doesn’t Save Net Neutrality, 




411.  Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d at 659. 
412. Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55
UCLA L. REV. 359, 407 (2007). 
413. Id.
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